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PRORATION 1 of production of the major mid-continental oil pools in
the United States has now been in general operation for well over
two years.2 By proration the oil-producing states, acting through
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1. For a general discussion of the precise method of proration, consult
Marshall and Meyers, Legal Planning of Petroleum Production (1931) 41 YALE
L. J. 33, 55, and authorities there cited.
2. The idea of prorating a restricted allowable of oil production among the
producers within a particular pool seems first to have been embodied in a
statute in Oklahoma in 1915. OXLA. SESs. LAWs (1915) c. 25. Before that
time, the Oklahoma Corporation Commission, acting under a general anti-trust
statute, sought to accomplish somewhat the same result by prohibiting the
purchase of oil from certain flush fields-principally the Healdton and Cush-
ing pools-at less than a fixed price. See Orders No. 844, 846, 846A, in Cause
No. 2041, Corporation Commission of Okla. (1914), reprinted in Transcript
of Record before Supreme Court of U. S., Champlin Refining Co. v. Corpora-
tion Commission, [286 U. S. 210 (1932)] Vol. 2, part 3, 244 et seq.
Following the decline of the Healdton and Cushing pools and a rapid rise
in the price of oil during the great war and the years immediately following
it, the Oklahoma proration statute became a dead letter. It was not until
the latter part of 1926 when the price of oil had again declined to an un-
comfortable level that proration was heard from once more-this time at the
instigation of certain Oklahoma producers who voluntarily empowered a pri-
vately paid umpire to regulate production in the Seminole pool. Subsequently
in 1927, the privately paid umpire was officially approved by the corporation
commission, and his orders allegedly became proration orders of the com-
mission under the 1915 act. By 1930 the production of the entire state of
Oklahoma was thus prorated. Id. Vol. I, part 21, 279 et seq.
Meanwhile agitation for proration in Texas grew apace and dates back to
the development of the Yates, Hendricks and Winkler pools in 1927 at which
time a producers agreement to prorate was reached. See Donoghue, Proration
in Texas (1931) TRANSACTIONS OF AmERICAN INSTITUTE OF MINING AND MITAL,
LURGICAL ENGINEERS. Encouraged by the Mid-Continent Oil and Gas Associa-
tion, such agreements spread to other flush fields and by the spring of 1931,
the official conservation agency of the state, the railroad commission, was
promulgating proration orders based largely on these agreements. Consult
McIntyre, Production in 1930 (1931) 29 OIL AND GAS JOURNAL No. 37, p. 90.
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administrative commissions, have set production quotas for each
pool as a whole and allocated these quotas among the variously
owned wells within the pools. During the early part of this period,
the daily output of crude was slashed from some 2,500,000 to ap-
proximately 2,100,000 barrels 3-the overhanging weight of vast
immediate potential production was largely lifted from the market 4
See also MacMillan v. Railroad Commission, 51 F. (2d) 400 (W. D. Tex. 1931).
A statute authorizing proration orders by the Texas Railroad Commission was
first passed on August 12, 1931 and amended in November of 1932. 42 Legis-
lature, 1st called sess. (1931) c. 26, § 1 et seq.; 4th called sess. (1932) c. 2.
TExAS STAT. (Vernon, Supp. 1933) §§ 6014, 6014a, 6029, 6049a, C. d.
In California, proration was first attempted by voluntary coSperation between
producers in 1928. Late in 1929, an operators' general committee was set up
as a general fact finding agency and an umpire appointed to secure general
compliance with proration quotas. McIntyre, supra. Following authorization
of unit development in the great Kittleman Hills field by the federal government
[46 STAT. 1007 (1930); 30 U. S. C. Supp. § 184 (1930)], the work of the
California Voluntary Curtailment Committee was gradually perfected despite
the failure on referendum of proration legislation similar to that of Oklahoma.
See 2 CAL. GEN. LAWS (Deering, 1931) .§ 5636 (Senate Bill No. 362) defeated
on referendum held May 3, 1932. Kansas, after first attempting voluntary
"'co-operation" passed a proration law similar to that of Oklahoma in March
of 1931. KAN. LAwS (1931) c. 226. See ELY, THE OIL AND GAS CONSERVATION
STATUTES ANN. (1933).
3. Average daily domestic production in the United States in thousands
of 42 gallon barrels for weeks ending-
July 11, 1931 .................. 2,538
July 18, 1931 .................. 2,430
August 8, 1931 ................ 2,551
September 29, 1932 ............ 2,092
November 5, 1932 .............. 2,097
November 12, 1932 ............. 2,127
November 19, 1932 ............. 2,117
OIL AND GAS JouRNAL, Weekly Production Reports.
4. Potential production figures are largely a matter of guesswork. A lead-
ing petroleum economist admits that "the actual potential of the country Is
mot precisely known" but suggests that at the close of 1930, it was running
in the neighborhood of 14,000,000 barrels daily. Pogue, The Economics of
Crude Oil Potential, a paper delivered before the petroleum division of A. I.
I. E. in February, 1931, reprinted in (1931) 29 Om AND GAS Jonmitx, No. 41,
p. 25. In January of 1931, the corporation commission of Oklahoma found
potential production to be 10,000,000 barrels daily. Transcript of Record,
-Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission, supra note 2, Vol. 1, No.
122, 78, 79.
No purpose will here be served by attempting to approximate the correct
figures. "Potential," like "fair value," has become a bookkeeping figure upon
-which to base a claim for a prorated allovable. Actual potential is a function
of many variables including rate and period of flow, manner of operation,
-density of wells and a host of geological unknowns peculiar to each field under
consideration. For instance, no one pretends that the great wells of the Okla-
homa City field which have a proration potential based upon a four hour open
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-the "statistical position" of the industry was further improved
by the withdrawal of some 70,000,000 barrels of stocks from storage 5 '
-and the price of the product soared more than 500% from a dead
low of a few cents to slightly over one dollar per barrel.0
Then, in one of those violent swings so characteristic of the petro-
leum markets, the trend was completely reversed; production turned
sharply upward and prices pointed steeply downward. 7 In a few short
months the gains so laboriously consolidated during the initial stages
of proration were virtually wiped out. Haunted by the spectre of
ovgrhead costs 8 and a drastically prorated volume of allowable
flow test with all adjacent wells shut in, could sustain such a rate of flow for
even twenty-four hours, let alone for an extended period. Yet despite the
numerical divergence of estimates of actual potential for the nation, all cal-
culators agree that for several years, if all restraint were removed, produc-
tion would be greatly in excess of present current consumption.
5. Crude stocks at the close of 1930, 1931, and 1932 totalled 411,882,000;
370,919,000; 343,250,000 barrels respectively. See (1933) 31 OIL AND GAS
JOURNAL No. 36, p. 8.
6. See note 7, infra.
7. Average posted price per barrel of 360 gravity mid-continental crude for
typical weeks of the period under consideration are as follows.
July 31, 1931 .................... 18
July 24, 1931 .................... .38
August 22, 1931 ................. .62
November 2, 1931 ................. 77
April 1, 1932 ................... 92
October 15, 1932 ................. 1.04*
December 15, 1932 .............. 69 -. 88
January 20, 1933 ................ .44
*Certain of the Standard Oil companies, (including Stanolind, Humble, and
Carter) as well as a large number of the smaller purchasing companies, refused
to meet the rise in posted prices led by the Sun Oil Company. See weelly
quotations published in the OIML A GAs JOURNAL.
8. That fixed charges are exceedingly heavy in the first few years of opera-
tion in the case of an oil well may be easily illustrated. The drilling cost of
a well in a field like East Texas (a shallow and cheaply drilled pool) runs
from $20,000 to $30,000. A large part of the original investment of the inde-
pendent operator is usually borrowed-probably at a premium because of the
speculative nature of the enterprise. Assuming that the principal sum draws
interest of at least 6% and must be amortized in the first three or four years
of operation and that 1/8 of the gross income is paid out as royalty, and that
a further outlay for production taxes, gathering, transportation and operating
expenses is necessary before an operator can realize any income from hia well,
it is obvious that an insufficient volume of production, even at a "fair" price,
tempts an operator, burdened with such unavoidable "costs," to increase his
volume by illicit production. And once started by any considerable number of
operators, the practice must increase in geometric progression as the bootleg
price eventually lowers the posted price. Continued cuts in the proration quotas




production, 9 an ever increasing number of so-called independent
operators resorted to bootlegging production in excess of proration
quotas to meet fixed charges and avoid the loss of their wells. 10
Their plight was aggravated by an ever decreasing allowable made
necessary, if prices were to be sustained, by the rapid upbuilding
of potentials from competitive drilling in both lmown and newly
discovered flush fields."" Probably no one will ever know just how
9. See note 11, infra.
10. As early as July 1, 1932, it was reported that if wells in the East Texas
field were ". . . cut back every two weeks, as they have been in the past, the
daily gross revenues from the wells will be so low as to force many of the
operators into the hands of the receivers." (1932) 31 Om AND GAS JoURNAL
No. 7, p. 34. Two weeks later: "production and distribution figures seldom can
be made to balance in this field", as some of the pipe lines show one set of figures
to the Railroad Commission and another set to the producer. Refiners are re-
luctant to pay the posted price of 98 cents for legally produced oil when the
competitors are buying "overage" at 50 cents. I& No. 9, at 58. This overage
was estimated at from 20,000 to 100,000 barrels daily. I&. No. 10, at 99. When
the railroad commission sought to plug up the leaks by requiring the pipe lines
to show affidavits that oil was "legally purchased," shipments by tank car tripled
in three weeks. Id. No. 15, at 36. By the middle of September, stopping
illegally run oil was said to have become the "most important matter before
the petroleum industry of the United States.' Id. No. 18, at 7. In East Texas
alone it was estimated that some 400 trucks were running bootleg oil to local
refineries and tank cars under cover of darkness and with such a condition
prevailing, the "posted price" of 98 cents was "becoming less and less a factor
in purchases." Id. No. 17, at 7, 32. Operators resorted to ingenious mechani-
cal devices to "by-pass" oil from producing wells, the most spectacular of which
was the erection of a concrete "pill-box", allegedly to protect the well from
marauders, but effective to protect it from inspection by proration officials.
(1933) Id. No. 35, at .
Meanwhile, in Oklahoma events followed much the same course. In June
of 1932, Governor Murray ordered the installation of better meters at specified
points on the pipe lines, "in order that proration may be carried out in truth
and in fact"; by July he found it necessary to put national guardsmen in the
Oklahoma City field to prevent illicit runs of crude; by August an investiga-
tion of oil thefts was commenced by the Legal Advisory Committee of the
Oklahoma Statewide Proration Committee, because the pipe line runs failed
to balance; by September the discovery of over 3,500,000 barrels of unreported
oil by the Oklahoma Tax Commission precipitated a general investigation of
proration by the Corporation Commission. (1932) Id. No. 8, at 49; No. 9, at 9;
No. 12, at 31; No. 18, at 49.
11. A total of over 5000 new wells, virtually all of them large commercial
producers, were completed in East Texas alone during 1932. In July of that
year 1279 wells were completed in the country at large, of which East Texas
reported 719. From September, 1931, until the close of 1932 the proration
allowable in East Texas was decreased from 225 barrels to approximately
30 barrels per well. Similar though less spectacular development was taking
place throughout the other major producing areas. The situation as respects
allowables was further aggravated by the discovery and development of new
fields, the most troublesome of which proved to be in the Gulf Coast region,
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much illicit oil has been run from the prolific pools of Oklahoma
City and East Texas during the last few months. But investigation
of proration administration clearly establishes the movement of vast
quantities of "hot oil" to market at discounts ranging up to 50% of
officially posted prices.12 Such price cutting has been more than the
large integrated producers and refiners of crude, presumably buying
at the posted prices, could stand.13 Their gasoline sales already
seriously undermined by tax evading retailers, 14 the major com-
panies felt themselves unable to meet the additional competitive
where a new pool near Conroe built up a potential production of well over
200,000 barrels daily in the course of six months. This pool, strategically
located near tidewater, absorbed the market for East Texas crude as East
Texas had previously absorbed the market of older fields. Nor was this all
-an extensive "play" developed other new pools along the Gulf Coast in Texas
and throughout Oklahoma, Kansas, Michigan and northern Louisiana. For
developments at Conroe see (1932> OIL AND GAS JOURNAL No. 8, 55; No. 20,
at 77; (1933) No. 38, at 46. For the yearly summary of development in
the United States see Id. No. 38, at 82, 88, 97, 105.
Competitive drilling was further stimulated by the method of proration
used. Proration based on a fiat or potential per well allowable rather than
upon acreage content was a direct invitation to drill. See Marshall and Meyers,
supra note 1, at section V.
12. See note 10 supra. Some idea of the magnitude of "stolen" production
may be gained from testimony adduced in a recent probe of proration obser-
vance by a committee of the Oklahoma Senate: One refinery admitted purchase
of over 500,000 barrels of "hot" oil. One prominent official testified that his
company had overproduced 1,000,000 barrels in 13 months, and when asked
how it was done he replied, "We just filled our tanks and pumped the oil out,"
Still others admitted purchases of illegal production totaling hundreds of
thousands of barrels. (1933) 31 OIL AND GAS JOURNAL No. 37, p. 11. A similar
probe by the Railroad Commission of Texas revealed a comparable situation
existing in East Texas, where one large pipe line was asked to explain an alleged
discrepancy of 1,000,000 barrels in slightly over a year. Id. No. 35, at 7;
No. 36, at 13.
For a recent tabular sunmary of illegal production in East Texas, see Id.
No. 40, at 32.
13. It is assumed by the large integrated companies that most of the il-
legally produced oil moves to small refiners and appears eventually on the
market as cut-rate gasoline. Support for this belief is found in the mush-
room-like growth of small refineries in East Texas during the last year. See
(1932) 31 OIL AND GAS JOURNAL, No. 16, p. 40 (statement by Harry F. Sinclair,
President, Sinclair Oil and Refining Co., expressing the opinion that if Illegal
runs of crude could be stopped, the price would remain firm).
14. The effect upon the retail market of gasoline tax evasion is beyond
the scope of this article. It is enough for present purposes to note that the
tax evader, generally a small retailer as contrasted with the nationally known
sellers, has been able to cut prices by reason of his pocketing the amount of
the tax. See Constitutionality of Gasoline Taxes in the Light of Their Cur-




disadvantage of cheap "stolen" raw material moving to uninquiring
small refiners. First, several of the Standard companies refused to
meet a rise in crude prices posted by a group of their competitors-
then these competitors slipped back to the Standard level and finally
the whole price structure once more collapsed.1 r
But this statistical record of two years of proration gives no clue
to its purposes and implications. Proration is the device hit upon
by the oil industry to meet the problems of excess capacity, problems
apparently now common to the production of virtually all raw mate-
rials in this country. A proper and adequate solution of the legal
problems involved in proration is important not only in order that
the oil industry may be saved from the chaos of competition in which
it finds itself but also because proiation may well be applied as a
means of planning production in other demoralized industries. The
problem of the law, in its broadest sense, is to forge a means of
control that gives promise of striking a fair balance between in-
tensely conflicting interests-interests which embrace the many
factions within the industry, the states in which the industry is
situated and the consumers of its products scattered throughout the
nation at large.
Improvement in the general statistical position of the oil industry,
so long as proration was effectively enforced, seems clear and certain.
Yet the many legal and economic justifications of proration as applied
to oil production appear hopelessly confused and conflicting. Pro-
ponents of proration have justified this control of production as
a measure for "conservation." "Conservation" has been put forward
as the reason for proration by the legislatures of the mideontinental
oil states.16 It has served courts as a constitutional peg for such
legislation.' 7 It has been invoked by Governors Murray and Sterling
in their martial law proclamations, which shut down or reduced flush
flow in Oklahoma and East Texas.'" Both sellers and purchasers of
crude have declared it to be the mainspring of their desire for a
15. See note 7, supra.
16. See text of statutes cited note 2, supra.
17. See Section VI, infra.
18. "Whereas, the shutting down of all producing wells of the state
is a measure of conservation . . . " Executive Order, Calling Out of TIh
National Guards, Declaring Martial Law And Ordering Military Control To
Close Down All Prorated Wells (Aug. 4, 1931) reprinted in (1931) 30 OIL
AND GAs JOURNAL No. 12, p. 13, 112. "Whereas it is necessary for the pre-
servation of the crude petroleum oil and natural gas in the defined district
that the reckless and illegal exploitation of the same be stopped until such
time as the said resources may be properly conserved and developed...
"Proclamation by the Governor of the State of Texas," note 64, infra.
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legally limited output of petroleum. 19 An Oil States Advisory Com-
mittee has assumed it to be the ultimate purpose of a proposed inter-
state compact prorating production among producing states.20 And
true to its name, the Federal Oil Conservation Board has couched its
program in terms of "conservation." 21
19. As long ago as January, 1929, W. S. Farish, President of the Humble
Oil and Refining Co., felt that the new year would be "prosperous in direct
proportion to the success of the industry in conserving and restraining pro-
4duction," and E. B. Reeser, then President of the Barnsdale Oil Co. and of
the American Petroleum Institute, wanted royalty owners to participate In
"conservation work," and approved the appointment of the Federal Oil Con-
servation Board by President Coolidge for further conserving our natural
resources. Likewise, Frank Phillips, President of Phillips Petroleum, insisted
that voluntary cooperation was ineffective to promote that orderly development
which "sound economics and true conservation demand." At a meeting of Okla-
homa oil men held at Tulsa on February 5, 1929, it was decided to limit
production in Oklahoma to 650,000 barrels per day "in the interests of con-
servation." (1929) 27 OIL AND GAS JOURNAL No. 33, at 30; No. 34, at 38;
No. 38, at 29. In October of 1931, Judge H. 0. Caster, general counsel for
Henry L. Doherty Co., insisted that "it behooves our government to protect
our vanishing natural resources for the longest possible period of time for
:future generations," (1931) 30 OIL AND GAS JOURNAL No. 23, p. 17; and in
November a year later Mr. Pew, Vice-president of the Sun Oil Co., declared
that the oil industry is interested "primarily in conservation and then in
price, and in price only as that price affects ponservation", 31 Id. No. 26,
.at 21. And in the same month Amos L. Beatty, retiring president of the
American Petroleum Institute, told the annual meeting of that association
.hat the new Texas proration law restricting production to market demands
was "not price fixing or valorization" but "conservation". Id. No. 26, at 24.
20. On February 28, 1931, Governors Murray and Sterling met with repre-
,sentatives of the Governors of Kansas and New Mexico at Fort Worth "for
the purpose of discussing the conservation of crude petroleum and natural
,gas and to bring about concerted action on the part of all oil producing states."
'They agreed to form an Oil States Advisory Committee "to sponsor such . . .
legislation . . . as may be necessary effectually to conserve . . . their
matural resources for the benefit of the public and posterity. . . . " This
-committee was enlarged to include representatives of all the major oil pro-
ducing states and met on April 14 and 15 in St. Louis where it was unani-
mously agreed that a curtailment program "will best promote conservation
of the natural resources of our states." Transcript of Record before the
Supreme Court of U. S., No. 11, Sterling v. Constantin, 170 ot seq. Out of
these early beginnings the idea of an interstate compact sprung. See notes
103, 104, infra. Also see ELY, OIL CONSERVATION THROUGH INTERSTATE AGREE-
MENT (1933).
21. The Federal Oil Conservation Board was appointed in 1924 by Prest-
-dent Coolidge to prevent "a future shortage in fuel and lubricating oil, not
to mention gasoline." He indicated that the future of the industry "might
'be left to the simple working of the law of supply and demand," if the oil
industry's welfare was not of such grave public concern as to require "that
Government and business . . . join forces to work out this problem of
practical conservation." In its first report the Board suggested that "State
[Vol. 42
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Yet here is no thread by which the conflict and confusion of legal
and economic argument may be woven into an orderly and satisfac-
tory pattern. These many advocates are too obviously referring to
many different and often times inconsistent kinds of conservation.
Thus while the early reports of the Federal Oil Conservation Board
recommend conservation of our purely physical oil resources to avoid
future shortage, and even suggest the acquisition of foreign sources
of supply by American capital,22 the most recent report of that board
seems largely concerned with the conservation of oil "investments"
and has gone so far as to endorse curtailment of foreign imports
through the medium of a tariff or partial embargo.23 Spokesmen for
governments should promptly study the economic advantage of coiperative
action . . . " and recommended that State legislation should be enacted
"' . . . with the declared purpose of conservation . . . " (italics ours).
REPORT I OF THE FEDERAL OIL CONSERVATION BOARD (1926) 24. Even as late
as 1930 this Board proclaimed that "The purpose of the several conservation
measures urged by the Federal Oil Conservation Board is primarily to delay
the coming of the day when an impending shortage of crude oil will cause
a radical advance in the prices of refinery products . . . " IV Id. (1930) 8.
22. Fear of scarcity is the dominant note of the first report of the Federal
Oil Conservation Board, published in 1926. The Board recommended intensive
exploration for new fields and deeper sands, more efficient recovery from old
fields, better refining methods, research by engine builders to secure more
efficient use, and "the expansion of American holdings in foreign fields." "The
fields of Mexico and South America are of large yield and much promising
oil structure is as yet undrilled. That our companies should vigorously acquire
such fields is of first importance, not only as a source of future supply, but
supply under control of our own citizens . . . . Moreover, an increased
number of oil sources tends to stabilize price and minimize the effect of fluc-
tuating production." REPORT I OF THE FEDERAL OIL CONSERVATION BOAnD
(1926) 12, 13.
23. " . . . unrestricted production . . . means the temporary or even
permanent abandonment of the older wells of settled production, with at-
tendant dislocation of investments." REPORT V OF THE FEDERAL OIL CONSERVA-
TION BOARD (1932) 3. After pointing out that crude oil prices at the end of
the first half of 1932 were over twice those of a year ago and five times the
1931 lows, the Board insists that "the American oil industry gives indica-
tion of being the first basic industry to emerge from the world depression,"
and "the effects of the industry's rising purchasing power are beginning to
be felt." Id. at 1. The Board did not explain the connection between con-
servation and "rising purchasing power" or emergence "from the world de-
pression."
With respect to foreign imports the Board suggests that they be curtailed by
"a flexible tariff" or "partial embargo." Id. at 24-25. Robert G. Stewart,
President of the Pan-American Petroleum and Transport Co., tesitfying before
the Ways and Means Committee against the tariff on oil passed by Congress
in June of 1932, characterized this change of front as a 'reach of faith to
the companies" which had been urged by the Board to "vigorously acquire
and explore" foreign fields. (1933) 31 On. AND GAS JounNArL No. 39, pp.
14, 93. Clearly enough, were the Board still "primarily" interested in delay-
19331
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the Oil States Advisory Committee likewise speak generally of the
need of conserving natural resources for future use and yet advocate
that some Federal agency participate in a projected interstate compact
to prorate or prohibit imports of foreign crude.24  Similar contra-
dictions characterize the attitude and actions of the martial law
Governors of Texas and Oklahoma who speak indiscriminately of
proration as a scheme to conserve oil, to conserve the price, to con-
serve taxes, and to conserve the independent producer.-5 Those en-
gaged in the oil industry add further to the confusion when they
publicly declare for proration to conserve oil in the ground while
they privately seek support among their own numbers for proration
to conserve the price in the market.26
ing "the coming of the day when an impending shortage of crude oil will cause
a radical advance in the prices of refinery products," that danger, if real,
could best be minimized by the purchase of as much and as cheap foreign crude
as possible. That the danger of scarcity which the Board foresaw in 1926
was at least somewhat exaggerated, see note 4, supra, and note 123, infra.
24. See infra, section IV.
25. See Marshall and Meyers, supra note 2, at 52-55. Also see text of
Governor Sterling's proclamation of martial law in Transcript of Record before
the Supreme Court of U. S., No. 11, Sterling v. Constantin, 90-93. It is In-
teresting to note that in Governor Murray's letter of February 5, 1931 inviting
Governor Sterling to send a delegate to the first meeting of the Oil States
Advisory Committee, he declared that proration was necessary because "the
oil industry is in the dumps, which greatly affects labor and the increase of
the unemployed." Id. at 170. And in a subsequent letter to Governor Ster-
ling, on April 18, he wrote "that the independent producers are now in a
distressed condition," and recommended that the report of the Oil States Ad-
visory Committee be approved because "it will insure a ready market for the
allowable production and will remove the menace of distress crude," and also
permit the producing states to control the situation "in the interests of their
natural resources, their taxable revenues, and their entire citizenship." Id.
at 196, 197.
26. This is illustrated by a colloquy between Mr. Robert R. Penn of the
Oil States Advisory Committee and Dan Moody, former Governor of Texas
and Attorney for those opposing proration in East Texas, in a hearing before
the Railroad Commission in March of 1931. Mr. Penn testified that conserva-
tion was the object of the Oil States Advisory Committee and "price was not
mentioned and was not the actuating influence." Mr. Moody asked, "Why
-was price not discussed?" And Mr. Penn replied, "Because our attorneys told
us we could be concerned only with conservation." "Are you not interested
in prices?" asked Mr. Moody. "Yes," answered Mr. Penn, "all oil men are.
We discussed prices as individuals. Unfortunately, we can not consider price
in fixing proration." (1931) 29 OIL AND GAS JoURNAL, No. 46, at 21, 124.
likewise, although Amos L. Beatty in his valedictory address as President of
the American Petroleum Institute on November 15, 1932 said that proration
was not "price fixing or valorization" but just "conservation," (see note 19,
supra) two months previously he made the following statement to the press:
"The movement to increase the well allowable in East Texas is dangerous
. . . Yes, I am thinking about price and price stability. I would not make
[Vol. 42
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Even the proration statutes attempt to lump a variety of aims and
purposes under the single word "conservation." It is true that all
such laws seek to conserve against "waste." But "waste" in addition
to its ordinary meaning includes "economic waste" and "waste in-
cident to the production of crude in excess of transportation and
marketing facilities or reasonable market demands." 7 And when a
an argument to the Railroad Commission based on these factors because the
Commission has nothing to do with price or economics-it deals only with
physical waste. But the argument is one which should appeal to those mem-
bers of the industry who are about to embark on a rash crusade. There is
no' market for additional East Texas crude, cxccpt at rcduced prices." (italics
ours) Ibid.
And perhaps this is conclusive: Testifying before a special legislative sesion
called to draft the "conservation" amendments of 1931, Governor Sterling of
Texas was asked: "Governor, is it not a fact that low prices are responsible
for this session?" He replied, "Yes, you would not be here if oil was selling
at $1.00 or $1.50 per barrel. We are losing hundreds of thousands of dollars."
(1931) 31 Om AND GAS JOURNAL, No. 11, at 21.
27. "That the production of crude oil or petroleum in the State of Oklahoma
in such manner and under such conditions as to constitute waste is hereby
prohibited." 2 OL.A- STAT. (1931) c. 59, § 11565. "That the term 'waste'
as used herein, in addition to its ordinary meaning, shall include economic
waste, underground waste, surface waste, and waste incident to the production
of crude oil or petroleum in excess of transportation or marketing facilities
or reasonable market demands." Id. § 11567. In addition, it is provided that
waste shall include "the production of crude oil at a time when there is not
a market demand therefor at a price equivalent to the actual value of such
crude oil or petroleum," which value shall be the average value "in the United
States at retail of the by-products of such crude oil or petroleum when refined
less the cost and a reasonable profit in the business of transporting, refining
and marketing the same." Id. § 11566. The Corporation Commission of
Oklahoma, however, has never predicated any of -its orders upon this last
section. See Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission, 286 U. S.
210, 232, 234 (1932).
In Texas it is provided that "the production, storage, or transportation of
crude petroleum oil or of natural gas in such manner, in such amount, or
under such conditions as to constitute waste is hereby declared to be unlawful
and is prohibited. The term 'waste' among other things shall specifically
include: . . . The production of crude petroleum in excess of transportation
or market facilities or reasonable market demand." T&. STAT. (Vernon, 1931)
tit. 102, art. 6014, as amended S. B. 1, Nov. 12, 1932. In Kansas waste of
petroleum is likewise prohibited, and waste "in addition to its ordinary mean-
ing shall include underground waste, surface waste, and waste of gas energy,
and waste incident to the production of crude oil or petroleum" KANe. LAws
(1931) c. 226, §§ 1, 2. Although the Kansas statute does not specifically
mention market demand, the public service commission entrusted with pro-
ration has apparently issued orders based upon it.
California likewise passed a statute prohibiting "waste" of petroleum, and
defined waste to include "the production of crude petroleum oil when the cur-
rent production together with the amount of crude petroleum oil and/or its
refined products in storage exceeds the current requirements for use within
1933]
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particular pool is prorated by reference to economic waste, reasonable
market demands, and an agreed upon state quota of a total fore-
casted demand for the nation at large,28 then conservation of natural
resources shades definitely into conservation of price and conservation
of existing capital structure.
As might be expected, this statutory confusion of purpose has lead
to judicial conflict of decision. This conflict commences in JAtian
v. Capshaw 2 9-- the very first case in which the legality of proration
was definitely challenged. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma divided
sharply over the purpose of proration in that state. Five justices, a
bare majority of the court, viewed the Oklahoma statute as directed
only to the prevention of waste of oil. One of these justices, more
bold than his brethren, frankly admitted that the "enforcement of
the conservation act may have some influence on price," but argued
that this influence is "merely incidental and not the primary purpose"
and that such an incidental result is "only another element of the
broad functions of the police power" by which the government may
"promote the general prosperity." A sixth justice, concurring only
in the result of the majority, expressed cautious concern lest con-
servation statutes become the vehicle of monopoly of supply or of
prices. Two dissenting justices went to the other extreme and saw
proration based upon "market demands" as a "mere subterfuge by
which control of prices is sought."
Following hard on the heels of the Julian decision by the Oklahoma
Supreme Court, proration orders were contested before a three judge
federal court in Champlin Refining Company v. Corporation Com-
mission.30 Again there arose a conflict of opinion among the judges.
and for shipment to points without the State, and for the maintenance in
storage of such reserves of crude petroleum oil and/or its refined products
as are reasonably necessary to meet and insure the continuity of an adequate
supply of crud6 petroleum oil and/or its refined products for such current
requirements as determined upon the basis of past experience, existing con-
ditions, and estimated future requirements of crude petroleum oil and/or its
refined products for such use and shipment." CAL. LAWS (1931) c. 585. This
particular provision, however, was defeated on referendum held May 3, 1932,
which left curtailment in California dependent upon the enforcement of an
oil-gas ratio (See Id. c. 791, § 8) and the efforts of a voluntary curtailment
committee which admittedly determines curtailment quotas by reference to
market demand. See note 2, supra. With respect to oil-gas ratio, consult
Marshall and Meyers, supra note 1, at 58.
28. As to the method of integrating market demand for a particular pool
with market demand for a state and for the nation at large, see infra section
'II.
29. 145 Okla. 237, 292 Pac. 841 (1930). Also see Marshall and Meyors,
supra note 1, at 56.
30. 51 F. (2d) 823 (W. D. Okla. 1931). See Marshall and Meyers, supr
note 1, at 56 et seq.
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Two circuit judges, comprising a majority of the court, while ad-
mitting the possibility of the statutory restriction preventing "a
supply in excess of the market demand" so as indirectly to "sustain
the price," nevertheless insisted that such "was not the main pur-
pose of the statute and the fact that it may have an indirect effect on
prices does not . . . render it invalid." The third member of the
court, a district judge, could not "escape the conclusion that the act
. .*is no more or less than a part of the legislative scheme to fix
prices for crude oil."
Contemporaneous litigation in Texas resulted in a similar conflict,
only here the line of conflict was between Federal and State Courts
rather than between judges of the same tribunal. The Texas statute
under which the Railroad Commission first prorated the flush fields
of that state did not specifically authorize proration as such. It merely
empowered the commission to prevent "physical waste" and expressly
excluded "economic waste" from consideration.3' The Railroad Com-
mission, however, with the example of Oklahoma before it, assumed
that proration was the most satisfactory means of preventing physical
waste in flush fields and proceeded to issue proration orders based
upon "market demand" as forecasted by nominations of prospective
purchasers of crude.32 Certain of these orders were challenged in
MacMillan v. Railroad Commisiol 33 in which a three judge Federal
court held them to be void "because issued in the attempted exercise,
not of a delegated, but of usurped powers." Circuit Judge Hutcheson,
31. "Neither natural gas nor crude petroleum shall be produced, trans-
ported, stored, or used in such manner or under such conditions as to con-
stitute waste: Provided, however, this shall not be construed to mean economic
waste. The Term 'waste' in addition to its ordinary meaning, shall include
permitting (a) escape into the open air of natural gas except as may be
necessary in the drilling or operation of a well; (b) drowning with water of
any stratum capable of producing oil or gas or both oil and gas in paying
quantities; (c) underground waste; (d) any natural gas well to wastefully
burn; (e) the wasteful utilization of natural gas; (f) the creation of un-
necessary fire hazards." TnX. STAT. (Vernon, Supp. 1931) tit. 102, art. 6014,
as amended by act of March 29, 1929. This was again amended by act of
November 12, 1932. See note 27, supra.
32. In an open letter to purchasers and transporters of crude oil in the East
'Texas Fields, the Texas Railroad Commission under date of May 23, 1931
urged " . . . prompt action in the form of fair offers to buy prorated oil
in substantial amounts and as near the posted price as possible and on that
stabilized basis only". See MacMillan y. Railroad Commission, 51 F. (2d)
400, 401, n. 1 (W. D. Tex. 1931).
33. Note 32, supra. Reversed and remanded with directions to dismiss
the complaint on the theory that the question had become moot as a result
-of subsequent amendment of the relevant statutory provisions. Railroad Com-
mission v. MacMillan, 53 Sup. Ct. 223 (1932). For amendments see note 27,
.&upra, and note 41, infra.
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writing the opinion of a unanimolis court, definitely indicated that
such usurpation was not so much the issuance of proration orders as
the determination of these orders by reference to "market demand."
He insisted that "under the thinly veiled pretense of going about to
prevent physical waste, the Commission has, in coperation with
persons interested in raising and maintaining prices of oil" attempted
"to control the delicate adjustment of market supply and demand in
order to bring and keep oil prices up."
But although Judge Hutcheson, speaking for a Federal court, felt
that the price fixing purpose of proration was so obvious as to be a
proper subject of judicial cognizance, the Court of Civil Appeals of
Texas in Danciger Oil and Refining Company v. Railroad Commis-
sion 34 reached the opposite conclusion. This court, while admitting
that the Commission had no authority to issue orders "to affect prices
or to prevent economic waste," declared that such limitation is not ai
-denial of power "to take into consideration an economic standard or
economic conditions if such conditions bear a direct or reasonable
relationship to physical waste." And whereas the Federal court
in the MacMillan case had insisted that the orders of the Railroad
Commission only "incidentally or accidentally" prevented physical
waste, the Texas court in the Danciger case proclaimed thht these
orders only "incidentally or indirectly influenced the price."
Inevitably this judicial conflict as to the purpose of proration was
presented to the Supreme Court of the United States for final de-
termination. The first such appeal to reach that tribunal was from
the decision 'of theFederal three judge court which had sustained
both the Oklahoma proration statute and specific orders of the Cor-
poration Commission restricting the production of the Champlin
Oil Company.35 The statute in question expressly authorized pro-
ration to "reasonable market demands" and the orders made there-
under were admittedly predicated upon "nominations" of expected
purchases by the main buyers of crude. The Supreme Court records
disclose that both the statute and its administration were denounced
as violating the constitutional guarantees of due process, equal pro-
tection and liberty of contract. More specifically, counsel for the
Champlin Company argued that the statute was invalid both because
it worked a deprivation of a vested property right to take all the
natural flow of oil and gas if produced without physical waste and
devoted to a useful purpose 31 and because it purposely and neces-
34. 49 S. W. (2d) 837 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
35. Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission, 286 U. S. 210 (1932).
36. Transcript of Record, Vol. I, part 1, at 32. And seo Id. Vol. I, part
2, at 379 et seq. The Champlin Refining Co. alleged that its nearby rofinoryr
could utilize efficiently all the natural flow of its Oklahoma City wells which
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sarily resulted in controlling crude prices for the special benefit of
the oil producers. A price fixing purpose and effect were likewise
imputed to the administration of the act. Further objections were
taken to the administrative orders on the ground that they were
arbitrary, inequitable, and in fact promulgated not by a public agency
but by a private umpire paid by interested producers. The Supreme
Court, per Mr. Justice Butler, unanimously sustained both the act
and the orders.
In so far as the opinion of the court approves legislation calculated
to prevent physical waste and protect correlative rights, the decision
follows a path already well marked by prior adjudications. Even
those who have held that particular statutes or orders are invalid
because serving a price-fixing purpose have not questioned pro-
rating free from such a sinister purpose. But in dealing with the
crucial question of whether or not this statute and these orders
constitute price-fixing, Mr. Justice Butler "puts aside plaintiff's
contentions resting upon the claim" that the applicable section of
the statute "authorizes or contemplates directly or indirectly regu-
lation of prices of crude oil," and asserts that "none of the commis-
sion's orders has been made for the purpose of fixing the price of
crude oil or has had that effect." 37 He seeks statistical support for
such statements by adopting the figures of counsel for the commission
showing that "when the first order was made the price was more
than two dollars per barrel" but it "had declined until at the time of
trial it was only thirty-five cents." 33
Yet if any one expected that this decision of the Supreme Court
would set at rest litigation arising out of proration, that expectation
was short lived. Indeed the seeds of further litigation sown by
Governor Murray in his proclamation of martial law closing down
the flush fields of Oklahoma in the summer of 1931 had already grown
into a new crop of law suits in Texas by the winter of 1932. Ter-
rified lest the MacMilan 9 decision result in a wide open East
Texas,40 the legislators of that state hastily assembled in special
the Corporation Commission had curtailed under proration. The company
further argued that proration compelled it to purchase oil from other pro-
ducers in order to keep its refinery in operation. For the effect upon adjacent
producers of allowing' the Champlin Company to produce beyond its prorated
allowable, see Marshall and Meyers, supra note 1, at 57.
37. Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission, supra note 35, at
232, 234.
38. Id. at 232. Transcript of Record, Vol. 1, part 2, 312 et scq., and Vol. 2,
part 2, 134 et seq.
39. Note 32, supra.
40. East Texas has been described as "the greatest field in oil producing
history." It embraces some 120,000 proved acres, and is estimated to contain
over 6,000,000,000 barrels of oil of which over 2,000,000,000 are recoverable
1933]
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session in J'uly of 1931, and with Judge Hutcheson's opinion before
them, they quickly drafted a new conservation act. Judge Hutcheson
had apparently- held that by the old conservation act the legislators
had' neither expressly- nor impliedly authorized the Railroad Com-
mission to institute a system of proration and more especially to
prorate to market demand. The legislators proceeded to cure the
first defect and aggravate the second. The new act expressly
authorized proration to prevent physical waste but expressly forbade
proration "to directly or indirectly limit the production of oil to equal
ezisting market dbmand." 11 In spite of this latter limitation of
the Commission's power, it was generally believed that proration to
prevent physical waste would hold East Texas in check once the
commission had had time to, make findings and issue the necessary
orders. In the interim, however, East Texas could, and for a few
by present production methods. See People's Petroleum Producers v. Smith,
1 Fed. Supp. 361, 363 (E. D. Tex. 1932). In area it embraces more territory
than six. of its nearest rivals in the United States, including Oklahoma City
and, Seminole in, Oklahoma, Yates and Hendricks in Texas, Hobbs in Now
Mexico, and Kettleman Hills in California. REPORT V OF FEDERAL OL CoNsERvA-
TION BOARD (1932) 43, fig. 3. The East Texas Geological Society declared in
September, 1931 that this field was "greatest in area; greatest in daily poten-
tial; greatest in future reserves; greatest in threat to the oil producing
business; and, if pfoduction is not restricted, it will be the greatest in waste
of. natural resources-" Id, at 42:
41. "Neither natural gas nor crude petroleum shall be produced, trans-
ported, stored or used in such manner or under such conditions as to consti-
tute waste; provided, however, this shall not be construed to mean economic
waste, and the Commission shall not have power to attempt by order, or other-
Wise; directly or indirectly,.to limit the production of oil to equal the existing
market demand for oil; and that power is expressly withheld from the Com-
mission, and no part of this Act shall ever be construed so as to prevent the
storage of oil except for the prevention of physical waste." . . "The
Commission shall have the right when it reasonably appears, and shall upon
the verigied' complaint of' any party showing that physical waste of crude
petroleum oil or natural gas is taking place in this State, or is reasonably
imminent, to hold such hearings at such times and places as it may fix, to
determine whether or not such waste is taking place, or is reasonably im-
minent, and to make inquiry into what rule, if any, or what regulation or
order shotild be' made, and what- action, if any, should be taken to correct,
preVent, or lessen the same within the meaning of this Act," . . .
"If it is the judgment of the Comnision that any reduction or adjustment
in the production of oil or gas, ff"mni any well or pool is necessary in order to
prevent the waste as herein defined of crude petroleum or natural gas from
any, such, well or pool, the: Commission. shall determine how to accomplish such
reduction or adjustment and such order shall be made in such manner as
to distribute, prorate or otherwise apportion such reduction or adjustment
anyong: the, wells committing such waste'o contributing thereto as the facts
justly' and equitably require." . . . TE. SrAT. (Vernon, Supp. 1931) art.
6049c, §' 7.
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days did, produce 1,000,000 barrels of oil per day.42 Confronted
-with this "emergency" and inspired by the example of the Governor
of Oklahoma, Governor Sterling on August 16th, 1932, placed the
East Texas field under martial law and ordered Brigadier General
Wolters to enforce a complete shutdown of every well in that area.4 3
Martial law was presumably to last only until the Railroad Com-
mission had opportunity to promulgate new proration orders in ac-
cordance with the new conservation act. Yet when, on September
2nd, 1931, such new orders were forthcoming, the troops stayed
on, allegedly to enforce the decrees of the Commission. The quotas
for the field and the allowables per well were steadily reduced. For
more than a month, this state of affairs continued without serious
interruption. By October 10th, the allowable had been cut from
225 to 165 barrels per well."
42. Official daily average production of the East Texas field for the week
prior to the military shut down totaled 738,000 barrels. (1931) 30 OIL AND
GAs JOURNAL No. 15, p. 11. Unofficial reports for the last twenty-four hour
period before the soldiers closed the wells showed an indicated production of
approximately 1,000,000 barrels. Id. No. 14, at 27.
43. Transcript of Record, Sterling v. Constantin, supra note 20, at 90.
44. Daily per well allowables in barrels for East Texas were as follows:
By order of the Railroad Commission-
September 2, 1931 .............................. 225
September 18, 1931 ............................. 185
October 10, 1931 .............................. 165
By order of Brigadier General Wolters incorporating order
of Railroad Commission of September 18th-
September 19, 1931 ............................. 185
By order of Governor Sterling to General Wolters-
October 29, 1931 ................................ 150
November 6, 1931 ............................... 125
December 10, 1931 .............................. 100
February 5, 1932 ............................... 75
By order of the Railroad Commission-
March 16, 1932 ................................. 78
April 1, 1932 ................................... 71
April 16, 1932 .................................. 67
M ay 1, 1932 .................................... 61
M ay 16, 1932 ................................... 59
June 1, 1932 ................................... 64
June 16, 1932 .................................. 51
July 1, 1932 .................................... 5 0
July 19, 1932 ................................... 46
August 1, 1932 ................................. 44
August 16, 1932 ................................ 43
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Then, the entire status of prorationing was again challenged in
litigation instituted by one Constantin, an East Texas producer, who,
claimed that because of the position of his wells on the structure he
was able to produce at least 5000 barrels per day without physical
waste.45 Constantin claimed that the Railroad Commission had again
prorated to market demand for the purpose of controlling prices;
this time in the face of express statutory prohibition. The Federal
district court granted a temporary order restraining the Railroad
Commission "from limiting the plaintiff's production below 5000,
barrels per well." 46 Constantin won his case.
But no sooner had the restraining order been issued than the
Governor ousted the Commission from control of proration and
September 1, 1932 ............................ 50
September 16, 1932 ........................... 46
October 1, 1932 ................................. 44
October 16, 1932 ................................ 40
November 1, 1932 ................... (No new order)
December 1, 1932 ............................... 37
December 17-January 1- (field shut in to measure
"bottom hole pressures.")
See Transcript of Record, Sterling v. Constantin, supra note 20, at 208-222;
(1933) 31 OnL AND GAS JouRNAL No. 36, p. 102.
On January 9, 1933, the Railroad Commission had completed its findings on
"bottom hole pressures" and issued an order allowing each flowing well 28
barrels per day plus .6 barrels for each 100 pounds of pressure above 1000
pounds. Since the maximum pressure in the field did not exceed 1500 pounds,
maximum production of any particular well could not exceed 31 barrels.
45. Transcript of Record, Sterling v. Constantin, supra note 20, at 13 ot seq.
Geologically the East Texas field is thought to be an ancient shoreline which
pinches out to a closure on the east to form a structure under pressure from an
hydraulic basin, the strata of which outcrops sixty miles from the western edge.
In general, maximum pressures are found in the western portion of the field,
and geologists claim that the field will drain from west to east-i.e., from the
high pressure region on the west to the low pressure region on the east. As this
drainage occurs, the oil on the west will presumably be replaced by a rising
water table. (1932) 31 OIL AND GAS JOURNAL No. 10, pp. 8-9, No. 20, pp. 38-39.
Constantin's wells were located in the western section of the field in Rusk County,
Texas. Transcript of Record, supra, at 3-5. Although geologists are not agreed
as to the amount of underground waste which might be caused by allowing
heavier withdrawals than proration permitted, Constantin apparently believed
that a rising water table would sooner or later drown out his wells and that the
time at which this occurred made little difference with respect to the total oil
recoverable from the field. In addition, he may have feared that a rate of flow
drastically choked back by the orders of the Railroad Commission would benefit
low pressure wells on the east. Given time the advancing water from the west
might wash oil originally lying beneath Constantin's land eastward to wells less
favorably situated on the structure. Id. at 46.
46. See Constantin v. Smith, 57 F. (2d) 227, 229 (E. D. Tex. 1932).
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commanded the troops to enforce proration orders even more
stringent than those of the Railroad Commission which the Federal
district court had just enjoined.47 Whatever its purpose, Governor
Sterling's action temporarily shifted the theatre of war from the
legal to the military field. But this shift was only temporary. On
February 18, 1932, in Constantin v. Smith-4 8 a three judge Federal
court launched a counter-attack by enjoining Sterling and his military
aides "from enforcing against plaintiffs [Constantin and others]
any of their so called military orders" and "from in any manner
interfering with the lawful production of oil from plaintiff's prop-
erty." Again Constantin won his case.
But the injunction was conditional, not absolute. The plaintiff's
"before opening their wells to produce more than their neighbors,"
were required either to show what amount of oil they could produce
without physical waste or, preferably, to produce no more oil than
the Railroad Commission might find could be produced without
waste.49  The legal effect of this skirmish was to oust the military
and restore the jurisdiction of the Railroad Commission. The
original temporary restraining order over which this battle between
the judiciary and executive commenced thus became a matter of
only theoretical importance, for under the conditions of the permanent
injunction the Railroad Commission was restored to control and
empowered to issue new orders.50
Presumably Constantin sought to restrain Sterling and his aides-
de-camp from curtailing production because he expected to reap an
47. See notes 44 and 46, supra; note 50, infra.
48. Note 46, supra.
49. Id. at 242.
50. Constantin's original bill of complaint, filed October 13, 1931, was to
restrain the enforcement of proration orders issued by the Railroad Commission.
Transcript of Record, Sterling v. Constantin, supra note 20, at 1. Enforcement
of these orders was restrained by District Judge Bryant by temporary injunction
issued October 28, 1931. Constantin v. Smith, supra note 46, at 229. But on the
very next day Governor Sterling, asserting that the martial law proclamation of
August "continued in full force and effect" and that there was "much dis-
satisfaction among landowners and small operators", commanded his Brigadier
General to restrict production to 150 barrels a day. Transcript of Record, -upre,
at 220-221. This was 15 barrels per day less than the allowable set in the order
of the Railroad Commission which had just been enjoined, see note 44, aiupra.
Whereupon Constantin amended his complaint to include Governor Sterling and
his Brigadier General as parties defendant. Constantin v. Smith, mupra note
46, at 229. By the time this amended complaint was heard on January 4, 1932,
the orders of the Railroad Commission against which restraint was originally
sought had expired. (Id. at 230). And as a net result of this shift of defendants
the Railroad Commissioii, under the terms of the permanent injunction, was
virtually required again to prorate the field. (I. at 242).
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individual balance of advantage from higher relative production."1
But while Constantin v. Smith was on appeal to the Supreme Court
of the United States, new orders that were forthcoming from the
Commission not only did not increase his allowable but still further
curtailed it.52 This compelled Constantin to start anew his original
attack against proration orders of the Railroad Commission.
This attack was promptly renewed along the old front in People's
Petroleum Producers v. Sterling.5 3 Here again Constantin and
others pitched "their case as MacMillan " did upon the proposition
that the orders assailed are not true conservation orders" but rather
"production restrictions." Such restrictions, they argued, were now
not only unauthorized but were expressly prohibited by the 1931
revision of the Conservation Act which forbade proration to prevent
"'economic waste" or "directly or indirectly to limit the production
of oil to equal existing market demand." 5 In July, 1932, the Federal
court ordered the plaintiffs to submit further evidence to support
their claim that proration had been administered not "with an eye
single to conserving waste" but rather "under the powerful and
unremitting pressure of the oil industry as a whole for limited pro-
duction in order to keep prices up." 6 In October, Judge Hutcheson,
speaking for the court, enjoined the Railroad Commission from
enforcing the challenged orders whose "settled purpose" and
"achieved result" was to keep supply "Within market demand." 57
Again Constantin won his case.
But before the decree was entered another special session of the
Texas legislature hurriedly authorized proration predicated upon
market demand.58 The Railroad Commission thereupon issued orders
predicated upon market demand. As might well have been expected,
51. As to Constantin's possible geologic advantage from higher production,
see note 45, supra. As for possible economic advantage, he alleged that he was
losing $1500 a day or $45,000 a month by reason of proration. This allegation
.assumes that with less restraint on production the market price of oil would
remain at the same level. But even were the price to fall, if Constantin and
others similarly situated were allowed larger production, he probably believed
that because of the favorable location of his wells he would be relatively bettor
off than his neighbors, to the east. See note 45, supra. Furthermore, since his
oil was selling at 83, cents per barrel at the time his amended complaint was
filed, the price would have to drop a long way before 5000 barrels per well at
the reduced price would yield less income than 165 barrels at current prices,
52. See note 44, supra.
53. 60 F. (2d) 1041 (E. D. Tex. 1932).
54. McMillan v. Railroad Commission, supra note 2.
55. Note 53, supra, at 1043.
56. Id. at 1048.
57. People's Petroleum Producers v. Smith, supra note 40.
58. See note 2, supra.
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this effected no appreciable change in the proration quotas.53 As for
Constantin, after winning every suit, his allowable was a quarter
of what it had been when he first commenced his successful litigation.
And to cap the climax, on December 17, 1932, by order of the Rail-
road Commission the entire East Texas field was shut down, ostensibly
to permit measurement of "bottom hole pressures." W "Bottom hole
pressure" was selected as a more equitable index for allocating
quotas than the per well basis previously employed.' Incidentally,
the shut down followed within a few hours a general cut of twenty-
five percent in crude prices.6
2
II
The Passing of Economic Dictatorship by Martial Law
Just prior to the most recent shut down of the East Texas field
by the Railroad Commission, the martial law controversy embodied
59. See note 44, supra.
60. (1932) 31 OIL AND GAS JouRNAL No. 31, p. 33.
61. In People's Petroleum Producers v. Smith, supra note 40, Circuit Judge
Hutcheson had held that even if ". . . the statutory prohibition against re-
stricting supply to 'equal existing market denmand' . . ." be disregarded,
nevertheless proration in East Texas based upon a flat allowable per well
.. . arbitrarily, unjustly, and in a confiscatory way . . ." took the oil of
the plaintiffs, favorably situated on the structure ". . . to give it to others
not so favorably situated.' Note 40, supra, at 365. As has been pointed out in
a previous article, proration based upon a flat quota per well fails to take into
account the size of the tract upon which a well is drilled, the thickness and
porosity of the sands underlying it. It violates the fundamental conception of
proration that each operator is entitled only to the recoverable oil and gas
lying beneath his land. It is a clear case where "political compromise ignores
geology." See Marshall and Meyers, supra note 1, at 53 et scq. It was to
remedy this declared inequity that the Texas Railroad Commissioners turned to
bottom-hole pressure as a means of according weight to these differences between
wells which they had formerly ignored. Theoretically, the pressure at the bottom
of an oil well gives some indication of its possible productivity-the higher the
pressure the better the well. Practically, bottom-hole pressure is the formula
hit upon to measure the productive capacity of a well without running an open-
flow test and labeling the result a "potential". It thus avoids the setting up of
"potentials" which some have thought exert a depressing effect upon the market
(see Pogue, supra note 4), but it fails, as do all potential figures, to take into
account the size of the tract upon which the well is drilled. See 3farshall and
Meyers, supra.
62. See note 7, supra. It is at least questionable whether it was necessary
to shut down the entire field merely to measure the pressure at the bottom of
certain key wells. "Incidentally or accidentally", the two weeks shutdown kept




in the case of Constantin v. Smith was finally passed upon by the
United States Supreme Court.63 That case was an aftermath of the
previous shut down of East Texas which had been accomplished
not by an order of the Railroad Commission for any such purpose as
measuring bottom hole pressures, but by a martial law proclamation
by the governor for the alleged purpose of suppressing insurrec-
tion.64 Under this proclamation, troops were maintained in the field
even after the field was re-opened under proration orders issued by
the Railroad Commission. 5 The immediate cause of the litigation
was the command of Governor Sterling to the troops that they
enforce the proration orders of the Railroad Commission after
the Commission had been enjoined by the Federal Court from en-
forcing those orders.60  In disposing of the case the Supreme Court
sharply rebuked Governor Sterling and affirmed the three judge
Federal court which had granted an injunction against this attempted
use of martial law "for the purpose and with the result of con-
trolling production."
Governor Sterling's proclamation of martial law had recited that
there existed in East Texas "an organized and entrenched group"
of oil producers who were "in a state of insurrection against the
conservation laws" and causing enormous physical waste; that such
waste would result in a decrease of state revenues and an increase
in state taxes; that the railroad commission required time to pro-
mulgate orders under the recently altered conservation act; that
there existed a "state of public feeling" on the "part of indignant
responsible citizens that if the state government cannot or fails to
protect the public interest and the interest of the land and royalty
owners, they will attempt to take the law in their own hands and by
force of arms shut down the producing oil wells." These conditions,
concluded the Governor, created an existing or imminent "state of
insurrection, tumult, riot and breach of the peace" calling for a
declaration of martial law.67
Courts are agreed that the executive has the exclusive power to
determine the necessity of calling out the troops.08 If a court
63. Sterling v. Constantin, 53 Sup. Ct. 190 (1932). Plaintiffs amended their
complaint in the original action of Constantin v. Smith, supra note 46, to include
Governor Sterling and his military aides as defendants after the East Texas
field was again placed under so-called "martial law".
64. Proclamation reprinted Transcript of Record before the Supreme Court
of U. S., No. 11, Sterling v. Constantin, 90-93.
65. See Constantin v. Smith, 57 F. (2d) 227, 231 (E. D. Tex. 1932).
66. Ibid, and see note 50, supra.
67. Ibid.
68. Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1 (1849) ; Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U. S. 78 (1909)
[see same case in 148 Fed. 870 (D. Colo. 1906)]; U. S. v. Wolters, 268 Fed.
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finds that the disturbance constitutes an "insurrection" sufficiently
analogous to a state of war, it will gracefully abdicate its jurisdiction
to determine the propriety of executive or military orders issued
under martial law. 9 If, however, the court finds that the disturbance
has merely assumed such proportions that the local authorities are
unable to maintain order, then the troops are regarded as merely
"in aid of civil authority" and are subordinate to the civil power.7°
The orders to the military, while in aid of civil authority, remain
.subject to review by the civil courts. Governor Sterling, in order
to salvage the proration policy endangered by the Federal court's
restraining order directed against the Railroad Commission, was
forced to claim that the threatened insurrection was so closely
analogous to a state of war as to leave the civil courts without power
69 (S. D. Tex. 1920); Ex parte McDonald, 49 Mont. 454, 143 Pac. 947 (1914);
In re Boyle, 6 Idaho 609, 57 Pac. 706 (1899); See also Martin v. Mott,
12 Wheat. 19 (U. S. 1827); Franks v. Smith, 142 Ky. 232, 134 S. W. 484 (1911);
U. S. v. Fischer, 280 Fed. 208 (D. Neb. 1922); FAmRMAN, THE LAW OF MATLr
RULE (1930) 84 et seq.; Arnold, Martial Law, 10 ENcYcLOP,%EDrA OF SOCIAL
SCIENCES.
69. See U. S. v. Diekelman, 92 U. S. 520 (1875) (confiscation of silver bullion
by General Butler a few days after New Orleans wrested from the Confederate
-forces); State ex rel. Mays v. Brown, 71 W. Va. 519, 77 S. E. 243 (1912); U. S.
-v. Fischer, supra note 68 (sentence of civilians to prison by the military, in a
jeriod of serious and prolonged labor disorders) ; In re Moyer, 35 Colo. 159, 85
Pac. 190 (1904) ; In re Boyle, supra note 64 (detention of civilians by military
authorities during a violent labor struggle). But cf. Franks v. Smith, supra
-note 68 (military officer held responsible for unlawful arrest made by troops
called out to check the activities of "night-riders"); Bishop v. Vandercook, 228
-Mich. 299, 200 N. W. 278 (1924) (military officer held liable for damage to
property caused by assisting a sheriff to prevent the transportation of liquor).
70. Franks v. Smith supra note 68; Bishop v. Vandercook, supra note 69;
Ela v. Smith, 71 Mass. 121 (1855). See CONSTITUTION OF TExAS, Art. 4, § 7:
The Governor ". . . shall be the commander-in-chief of the military forces of
the State . . . he shall have power to call forth the militia to execute the
laws of the State, to suppress insurrection, repel invasion, and protect the
-frontier from hostile incursions by Indians or other predatory bands." See also
Art. 4, §§ 1, 10. Owing to arbitrary executive action in reconstruction days, the
Texas Constitution imposes more stringent restrictions upon the Governor's
conduct in an emergency than those of most other states. But despite such
restrictions, in Texas as elsewhere, it is said that the ordinary constitutional
guarantees are automatically suspended-i.c., recognized by a declaration of
martial law-in an emergency so like a state of war as to threaten the very
existence of the constitution. State ex rel. Mays v. Brown, supra note 69.
Obviously, however, the distinction between martial law and troops in aid of
civil authority is more a matter of logic than of fact. Arnold, saupra note 68
and cases cited note 68, supra. But cf. FAmAN, op. cit. supra note 68, at 30-
39. Relevant statutory provisions may be found in TEX STATS. (Vernon, 1928)
§§ 5889, 5778, 5830, 5831, 5833, 5834.
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to review his military orders. 71 This application of martial law to
the situation in East Texas strained the analogy of "a state of war"
to the breaking point. In so far as the alleged "insurrection against
the conservation laws" was concerned, the very letters, telegrams,
resolutions and editorials which induced the executive to declare,
martial law, clearly reveal that such insurrection as may have existed
was an insurrection against low prices rather than against the
"conservation laws." 72 The Governor's claim of insurrection against
the conservation laws was still further weakened by the fact that
the' insurrection he feared was at most disobedience of proration
orders which had already been held invalid in the MaoMillan 78 case
as being beyond the scope of any existing conservation law. By the
time Governor Sterling was drawn into the Constantin case, although
the first revision of the conservation act allowed proration, the "in-
surrectionists" were demanding enforcement of curtailment orders
which had been held to have violated the statutory prohibition against
proration to market demand. 74
Governor Sterling, however, also declared that "insurrection, riot
and breach of the peace" threatened. After the re-opening of the
field under the supervision of the Railroad Commission, so long as
the troops were instructed merely to assist in enforcing the orders
71. The Governor's claim was apparently based upon certain leading cases
holding that upon a proper declaration of martial law the executive is endowed
with the powers of a military commander in time of war. Commonwealth v.
Shortall, 206 Pa. 165, 55 Atl. 952 (1903) ; U. S. v. Fischer, supra note 68; Stat-
ex rel. Mays v. Brown, supra, note 69; Ex parte Jones, 71 W. Va. 567, 77 S. E.
1029 (1913); Hatfield v. Graham, 73 W. Va. 759, 81 S. E. 533 (1914). The
latter three West Virginia cases are based upon a statute empowering tho
Governor to "declare a state of war"; W. VA. CODE (1913) C. 15, § 83. See also
FAIRmAN, op. cit. supra note 68, at 152-157.
72. This may be seen from extracts taken at random from "Martial Law in
East Texas," a pamphlet published by the East Texas Chamber of Commerce,
reprinting a collection of such letters, etc.; Martial Law "... will no doubt
save many small producers and refiners from bankruptcy . . . a benediction and
a blessing to all of Texas and especially to East Texas (this in a Christmas
message to the Governor) . . . the oil producers, royalty and land owners of East
Texas are being deprived of hundreds of thousands of dollars daily . . . pro-
tecting the future prosperity of this broad locality . . . there was a general
feeling of dissatisfaction among the land owners, both at the price received for
the oil and delay in receiving payment of royalties." The cause of delay in the
payment of royalties was the chaotic state of land titles in East Texas.
'73. McMillan v. Railroad Commission, supra note 2.
74. Prior to the Governor's challenged martial law orders, District Judge
Bryant had restrained the enforcement of even less stringent orders issued by'
the Railroad Commission. Transcript of Record, Sterling v. Constantin, oupras
note 20, 1 et seq.
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of the Railroad Commission, they .were clearly acting in aid of civil
authorities to suppress possible riot and breach of the peace. But
when they later were commanded to enforce as military orders,
the very orders of the commission which had been enjoined, they
were clearly acting not in aid of but in lieu of civil authorities.
To justify these latter orders, Governor Sterling was forced to insist
that this was an "insurrection" so like a state of war that he alone
was empowered to decide what measure should be taken to sup-
press it.75
The lower court in the Constantin case found as a fact that at no
time in East Texas had there been "any condition resembling a
state of war" since no insurrection or riot had occurred, nor had
there been any closure of the courts or failure of the civil authorities.--
And although the lower court disclaimed any power to review the
discretion of the governor in calling out the troops, it decided that
since no state of war had been shown, the troops must necessarily
act in aid of civil authorities so as to be subject to the jurisdiction
of the civil courts. The Supreme Court reached the same result
by a slightly different line of reasoning. It, too, admitted that the
,executive's determination that military aid is required in an exigency
is conclusive. It refused, however, to "undertake to determine the
intended significance of martial law and all its possible connota-
tions." "7 Whatever authority the executive might possess in a case
-of "insurrection," it took the position that there was here involved
,only troops in aid of civil authority. Mr. Chief Justice Hughes,
speaking for a unanimous court, said:
"The question before us is simply with respect to the Governor's
attempt to regulate by executive order the lawful use of complainants'
properties in the production of oil. Instead of affording them protection
in the lawful exercise of their rights as determined by the courts, he
sought, by his executive orders, to make that exercise impossible. In the
place of judicial procedure, available in the courts which were open and
functioning, he set up his executive commands which brooked neither
delay nor appeal. In particular, to the process of the Federal court actually
and properly engaged in examining and protecting an asserted Federal
75. See Constantin v. Smith, supra note 65, at 230, 232.
76. Id. at 232. It was formerly thought that a closure of the courts by rioters
-was the ultimate test of the existence of an insurrection justifying a declaration
-of martial law as opposed to troops in aid of civil authority, but Professor
-Fairman suggests that "the criterion of the courts being open or closed is
imperfect." FAmImAN, op. cit. supra note 68, at 147. Cf. the two leading British
cases, Ex parte Marais, (1902) A. 0. 109 and Rex v. Allen, (1921) 2 Ir. Rep.
:241.
77. Sterling v. Constantin, supra note 63, at 196.
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right, the Governor interposed the obstruction of his will, subverting the
Federal authority. The assertion that such action can be taken as con-
clusive proof of its own necessity and must be accepted as in itself due
process of law has no support in the decisions of this court." 78
Again Constantin won his case. But his greatest legal victory
merely served to dramatize his economic defeat. Governor Sterling
by his use of martial law had already achieved his main purpose-
delay until such time as the Railroad Commission or the legislature
might devise a plan of proration which would be both constitutionally
and economically acceptable. Such a plan had been embodied in the
revision of the conservation act shortly before the Supreme Court
handed down its decision.70 And five' days after the decision the field
was again completely shut in-this time ostensibly to measure "bot-
tom hole pressure." so
While Constantin both won and lost, the advocates of economic
dictatorship through the medium of martial law suffered a major
defeat. They had claimed that they had hit upon a summary pro-
cedure of production control which would be immune from judicial
attack.8' It is evident that however conflicting the various concepts
of martial law, this use of the military was an attempted extension
of martial law beyond its known scope. It sought to deal not merely
with disorder but attempted to remove the causes of dissatisfaction.
As well order the employer to raise wages to the level demanded
by rioting strikers and thus remove the cause of insurrection. The
proponents of the use of martial law, after all, were seeking merely
a temporary expedient to tide the oil industry over a depression. As
expressed by Governor Murray of Oklahoma, martial law was in-
tended to last only until oil reached a dollar a barrel.8 2 Deprived of
an artificial and unconstitutional means of temporarily avoiding the
larger issue of controlling excess capacity, the oil industry must
squarely face the fundamental' legal and economic problems of
equating productive capacity to market demand.
178. Id. at 197. Cf. Russel Petroleum Co. v. Oklahoma Corporation Commis-
sion, reprinted in (1933) 31 OIL AND GAS JOURNAL, No. 39, p. 33, in which the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma condemns Governor Murray of Oklahoma for tho
use of troops not in aid of but in lieu of civil authorities.
79. Note 2, supra.
80. Note 60, supra.
81. See Martial Law in East Texas, supra note 72; Governor Sterling is
quoted by a newspaper as saying, "The federal courts should not be permitted
to throttle the will of the people. This is the State's affair and the federal
courts should let the State take care of it." The newspaper adds that this "Is
another way of telling Uncle Sam to stay in his own backyard-if he has any.'"




Market Denmand And Price
Market demand has now, after several years of experiment, be-
come one of the basic criteria by which are determined both the
total production quotas of the states of Texas, Oklahoma and Kansas
and the proportion of such quotas to be allocated to the various large
pools within those states. In the foregoing states, curtailment to
market demand has been expressly or impliedly authorized by statute;
in California, despite the failure on referendum of similar legislation,
the same result has been achieved through the medium of a so-called
voluntary curtailment committee and in other less productive areas,
calculation of "market demands" plays an official or unofficial part
in limiting individual production to an agreed upon allowable.83
The prescribed method of determining market demand is dual in
nature. From statistics furnished by the Federal Bureau of Mines,
the Voluntary Committee on Economics of the Federal Oil Conser-
vation Board, and the American Petroleum Institute, the Oil States
Advisory Committee makes a forecast of the total demand of the
nation for a given period of time, and divides, by a process still best
described as "horse-trading," the amount thus derived among the
major producing states. 4 The administrative bodies entrusted with
proration meanwhile compile, with occasional variations in procedure
"nominations" for each pool of anticipated monthly purchases by
the buyers of crude.8 5 Theoretically these latter totals become the
83. See note 2, supra.
84. For typical estimates of demand by the Voluntary Committee on Petro-
leum Economics of the Federal Oil Conservation Board, see Transcript of
Record, Sterling v. Constantin, supra note 20, at 189. For similar findings by
the Oil States Advisory Committee together with their recommendations for a
division of production among the producing states, see id. at 193 ct seq. The
method followed for computing the national demand for crude is based solely
upon an estimated demand for gasoline. Thus the crude requirements are de-
termined by computing the amount of petroleum which under average refinery
methods will yield the calculated demand for gasoline. It is assumed that the
by-products remaining after the gasoline is recovered will be sufficient to satisfy
the demand for fuel oils and other petroleum products. Gasoline demand is
computed from statistics of motor vehicle registrations, traffic over toll bridges,
travel in national parks, etc. Bi-annual reports of the various fact-finding
agencies are published in the OIL AND GAS JOURNAL. Also see FEDEI.L O 5
CONSERVATION BOARD, SuRvEYs OF NATIONAL PETRoLEi R ,EQ)iRMENTS FOR
SEASONAL PERIODS, Government Printing Office, 1930, 1931, 1932; see ELY, OIL
CONSERVATION THROUGH INTERSTATE AGREEMENT (1933) 2G1.
85. See Marshall and Mleyers, supra note 1, at 65, and weekly field reports
contained in volume 31 of OIL AND GAS JOURNAL.
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market demand for the different pools.86 But "nominations" in
some fields have been considered too high and not bona fide proposals
to buy. Consequently an "adjustment" of these totals, practically
always downward, is made and the resulting figures are prorated
among the producing properties for the various pools.8 7 Strangely
enough, the sum of the market demands for all the pools in a state
approximate the quota agreed upon for that state by the Oil States
Advisory Committee. 8
There is clearly no necessary relation between the "market demand"
of the nation, or even of a pool, and a proper rate of flow which will
produce oil with the utmost efficiency. Geologists testify that there
is both a minimum and maximum rate at which a well should flow
to prevent avoidable underground wastes.8 0 As a technical matter,
it is conceded that physical waste can best be minimized by according
consideration to the geologic peculiarities of each pool. If produc-
tion geared to "market demand" operates a pool at its optimum, it
is merely coincidence.
86. The Oklahoma Supreme Court has recently held that since the statute
provides for proration to market demand "from any common source of supply,"
the commission is not authorized to determine the total demand from a field and
prorate such total demand among wells tapping separate sands (i.e., different
sources of supply) within a pool. Wilcox v. Corporation Commission, Supreme
Court of Oklahoma, decided February 15, 1933. Of course this complicates the
process of determining "market demand" still further as the commission would
have to measure "demand" for crude for each different producing horizon in a
pool instead of for the pool as a whole.
87. See (1933) 31 OIL AND GAS JOURNAL No. 33, p. 9. Field reports from
both Oklahoma City and East Texas indicate that the "over nomination" has
been the rule. See weekly field reports in (1933) 31 OIL AND GAS JOURNAL.
88. It has been argued that it is immaterial in determining demand, whether
the start be made with individual pools, the state, or the nation, since the
estimates, if accurate, will check throughout. Some states and one proposed
uniform proration statute, authorize the state commission to determine market
demand for the state as a whole and then prorate that demand among the
various pools within the state. See ErY, op. cit. supra note 20, at 160, 249. But
the experience in "adjusting" nominations (see note 83, supra) for pools to
tally with the quota for the state, clearly shows the fallacy of assuming that
the starting point is immaterial.
89. Although there is much disagreement among geologists as to the most
efficient rate of flow for any particular pool, it is apparently not disputed that
there is a minimum, as well as a maximum rate for each pool which should
be adhered to in order to secure maximum recovery. See testimony of W. P.
Haseman, reprinted in Transcript of Record, Champlin Refining Co. v. Corpora-
tion Commission, supra note 2, 1, No. 122, pp. 183 et seq.; (1932) 31 OIL AND
GAS JOURNAL No. 19, p. 14 (reporting statements of geologists, testifying in
People's Petroleum Producers v. Smith, supra note 40). And of. MacQuarrie,
Paraffine Problems Found in East Texas Oil Field and Methods of Prevention
and Treatment, a paper delivered before the East Texas branch of the American
Petroleum Institute, reprinted id. No. 25, p. 14.
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But the proponents of proration to market demand have assumed
that "market demand" is a "mere gauge of production," Il and that
limiting production to market demand merely avoids above-ground
storage and possible surface wastes. Thus far they have apparently
carried the United States Supreme Court with them. In the
Champlin 91 case, Mr. Justice Butler upheld the Oklahoma statute and
the orders issued thereunder. In his opinion, Mifr. Justice Butler seems
to find justification for proration to market demand in the alleged
avoidance of surface wastes which would otherwise occur because
of "serious -potential overproduction throughout the United States."
Although seemingly aware that there is a relationship between
"overproduction" and low prices, he nevertheless insists that pro-
ration which prevents "overproduction" has not had the effect of
controlling the price of crude. In this case Mr. Justice Butler "puts
aside" the contentions that the applicable sections of the statute
"contemplates directly or indirectly regulation of prices." He could
find nothing nefarious either in the legislative or administrative
purpose; and found convincing proof of the purity of purpose in the
fact that there was a "great and long continued downward trend of
prices contemporaneously with the enforcement of proration." He
does admit, however, that if it can be shown that proration orders
are "unjust or arbitrary" or proved "otherwise invalid" that a
different result might follow. This would seem to imply that if a
price fixing effect were demonstrated, proration orders might be
enjoined.
Despite the contention that market demand is a "mere gauge of
production," there is, after all no such thing as demand in a vacuum
-there is demand only at a price. The theory of the control of
production by proration is predicated upon equating supply to as-
certained demand by curtailing supply. But "ascertained demand"
can only be determined by reference to price. When there is an
alleged surplus of available supply, those who seek to calculate demand
must necessarily set a price sufficiently low to attract buyers to
absorb that alleged surplus. Conversely, if an overhanging supply
is removed from the market, the remaining supply can be disposed
of at a higher price; in other words, there would still be enough
purchasers to absorb the allowed supply who would buy even at the
90. See Hardwicks, Limitation of Oil Production to Market Dcmand, and
Parish, A Rational Program for the Oil Industry, papers delivered before the
Petroleum Division of the American Institute of Mining and Metallurgical
Engineers, reprinted in (1932) 31 OIL AND GAs JOURNAL No. 20, pp. 54 and 12
respectively. And see Ford, Controlling the Production of Oil (1932) 30 DIcH.
L. R. 1170, 1198.
91. Note 35, supra.
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higher price. So, if supply is set in terms of demand, those who
seek to calculate demand must inevitably consider the price range
at which that supply will be absorbed. The task of those who control
is somehow to restrict supply to satisfy the ascertained demand within
the selected price range. Despite the glib talk of the law of supply
and demand determining price as if the amounts demanded and
the amounts supplied at a particular price were independent of the
price in the supply and demand equation, no one of the components
of this equation is constant, but each is a variable and varies in
terms of the others. Whatever else may be done by judicial ex-
clusion, it is hardly possible to put aside the effect on a price equation
of holding constant-i.e. by proration-the supply term, no matter
how benign the purpose.
As proof that proration had no effect on prices, Mr. Justice Butler
accepted the figures of counsel for the state commission showing that
"when the first order was made the price was more than two dollars
per barrel" but the price "had declined until at the time of trial it
was only thirty-five cents." 92 These figures appear conclusive enough
despite the niceties of the price-equation syllogisms; but a more
searching examination of longer and broader price trends raises
serious question. Aside from vain speculation over what the price
of crude might have been had there been no proration, why is a
drop in price to thirty-five cents a barrel at the time of trial selected
as the basis of comparison and a subsequent rise to almost one dollar
by the time of appeal to the Supreme Court ignored? 0 3 The drop in
price of Oklahoma oil in the early stages of proration is satisfac-
torily explained as being due to the competition of crude from other
major producing areas which had not yet perfected proration pro-
grams.94 When the other producing states perfected proration, there
was an almost vertical rise in the price level which was acclaimed
by the industry as indicative of the success of proration.0 5 And this
occurred at a time when the immediate potential supply was greater
than ever before and the total consumption of petroleum products
92. See Transcript of Record, Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Com-
mission, Vol. I, part 2, pp. 310-312.
93. See note 7, supra.
94. See note 2, supra. The Oil States Advisory Committee had not perfected
its organization for the co-ordination of proration activity on a national scale
until the latter part of 1931. See note 20, supra.
95. See table of prices cited note 7, supra. It was generally admitted that
the low prices prevailing throughout the mid-Continental area in the summer of
1931 were due to the failure of proration in East Texas. The subsequent rise in
price dates from the time East Texas was brought under control, first by a
martial law shutdown, and subsequently by proration effectively instituted by
administrative and executive orders.
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was slackening for the first time in recent years.00 And if negative
proof be needed, in recent months with the failure of enforcement of
proration orders, the price structure has again collapsed."' Further-
more, at this time when price indices have steadily pointed down-
ward, 8 there has been a firming of the cost of crude whenever
proration is effectively enforced.
In defense of the contention that proration does not affect price,
it is urged that the demand for crude oil is inelastic and can be
forecasted with precision regardless of price. It is assumed that
the demand for crude is inelastic because the consumption of gaso-
line, its major product, is not greatly affected by current price
fluctuations so much as by the volume of motor transportation. 0
Even if it should prove true that gasoline consumption is relatively
inelastic it does not follow that the demand for crude likewise is
inelastic. When the price of crude drops, it attracts speculative
demand; large volumes go to storage to await a rise. Low prices
stimulate new, though inferior uses, such as furnace consumption,
and cheaper, though inefficient refining. And even if domestic de-
mand for crude is assumed to be inelastic, cheap crude encourages
export in competition with the low cost foreign fields.100 No matter
what allowance is made for the inelasticity of gasoline consumption,
these other outlets for crude, admittedly marginal demand, are af-
fected by and affect price. The pressure of this marginal oil on a
market straddled with large overhead costs exerts a depressing effect
on the whole price structure. Any scheme of proration by which




The interrelation of price and proration has created grave ad-
ministrative difficulties and involves intricate legal questions. Be-
cause of its effect on price, proration has done more than merely
promote physical conservation; it has resulted in an inter and intra-
96. See REPORT V OF THE FEDERAL OM CONSERVATION BOARUD (1932) 31 et SCq.
97. See Section I, supra, and note 7, supra.
98. Cf. SuRavE OF CURRENT BusINESs (U. S. Department of Commerce,
Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, 1931, 1932).
99. ELY, op. cit. supra note 20, at 261 ct scq. And see STocnING, THE OIL
INDUSTRY AND THE COMIPETITIVE SYSTEM (1925) 83-84.
100. STOCKING, STABILIZATION OF THE OIL INDUSTRY: ITS ECONoMIc AND




state struggle for the restricted market. To resolve these problems,
two major proposals have been put forward: a "uniform act for
oil and gas conservation" has been drafted and an interstate compact
between the oil producing states has been proposed.
The Oil States' Advisory Committee is sponsoring a proposed uni-
form law modeled upon already existing conservation and proration
statutes. The proposed law, however, has two unique features; it
speaks for the first time specifically of price, and it makes provision
for formal interstate co6peration. In respect to price the proposed
law provides that in order to prevent "the premature abandonment
of wells of settled production" the proper state commission may cur-
tail production until reasonable market demand is at a price at least
equal to the "average cost" of production from such wells.1 01 It is
declared that production of oil at less than such "average cost" will
cause waste of petroleum still capable of extraction from wells of
settled production, lead to inferior and wasteful uses of oil, and dis-
courage the discovery, development and preservation of adequate
underground reserves.102
101. PROPOSED UNIFORM ACT FOR OIL AND NATURAL GAS CONSERVATION AND
INTERSTATE COmPACT, by the Oil States Advisory Committee, 1933. And of. ELY,
op. cit. supra note 20, at 246 et seq. §§ 2, 5.
But average cost as used in the uniform act is ambiguous and susceptible of
manipulation. If all that is meant is bare operating cost, the act is sound, for
a price no lower than bare operating cost would keep wells on the pump in
operation, and the purpose of the act would be subserved. If, however, "average
cost" includes interest on investment or something attributed to intrinsic value
of the oil, then something more than maintenance of settled wells is intended.
102. Ibid. This measure has already been introduced in the legislatures of
several oil producing states. It is interesting to note that the revised draft of
such a uniform conservation statute, suggested by Mr. Northcutt Ely, Chairman
of the Technical and Advisory Committee of the Federal Oil Conservation Board,
does not provide for curtailing supply to insure a price sufficient to preserve
the wells of settled production. Mr. Ely's proposal merely prohibits waste
arising from the production of oil in excess of transportation or marketing
facilities or reasonable market demand. Yet Mr. Ely impliedly recognizes the
effect of proration to market demand upon price, for in § 5 of his proposed law
he provides that while the State conservancy commission "is not authorized to
regulate the prices at which oil and products thereof shall be sold . . . it shall,
in determining market demand, have reference to the interests of the consuming
public and of the oil industry in the maintenance of reasonable prices for oil
and its products,". ibid. And see id. at 222, (7) (b) containing a similar pro-
vision respecting a proposed Interstate Oil Conservation Board, which is re-
quired to estimate national demand "with reference to reasonable prices only,
and the necessity for maintenance over the maximum possible period." The
draft sponsored by the Oil States Advisory Committee seeks to protect the
consumer by requiring the commission in determining when abandonment would
be premature- "to take into consideration the interest of the purchasing and
consuming public in a reasonable price." PROPOSED UNIFORbi ACT, op. cit. supra
note 101, § 2.
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The proposed law also makes provision for participation in an
interstate compact of the oil producing states; 0 3 and is a counterpart
-of a bill recently introduced in Congress to gain federal participation
and consent. °4 The projected proposal would make legitimate the
present off-spring of the oil states, the Oil States' Advisory Committee,
and also would make it sui juris, capable of enforcing its rights.
Specifically the proposed interstate compact contemplates (1) the
adoption of a fact finding agency to forecast demand, domestic and
foreign, estimate supply, and allocate production quotas; (2) a tacit
agreement by each state to abide by the quotas set; (3) agreement
by the federal government to limit imports to the quota set; and
(4) the future recommendation of uniform conservation laws similar
to those embodied in the foregoing uniform act for oil and gas con-
servation. 05
In this legislative program resulting from the struggle of com-
peting interests for markets, the control of waste implicit in con-
servation has been forgotten. If the proposed legislation were to be
adopted, it promises to do little more than freeze the present methods
of operation. And it is extremely doubtful whether the present
system of proration has accomplished any appreciable conservation
of oil resources. Although a few minor surface wastes may have
been eliminated through the delay in production, there is not much
prospect of an appreciable increase in the maximum recovery from
the great flush fields or decrease in the cost of that recovery. Mere
delay in production affects price and has no necessary relation to
conservation.' 6 As pointed out in a previous article, no mere scheme
103. PROPOSED UmFOra ACT, op. cit. supra note 101, part II. The Act
proceeds upon the theory of offer and acceptance. The passage of the proposed
Act is declared to be an offer to other states which may be accepted by any
other state enacting similar legislation.
104. H. R. Rep., 72d Cong. 1st Sess., Ser. No. 12,076, S. 5258.
105. See notes 103 and 104, supra.
106. See Marshall and Meyers, supra note 1, Sections V, VI, dealing with
proration and unit operation. The question whether proration as practiced over
the last few years has made probable the recovery of more or less oil from
prorated fields, appears to be a much debated issue among geologists. Judge
Hutcheson, in People's Petroleum Producers v. Smith, supra note 40, at 363,
points out that the experts of the Railroad Commission claimed that the East
Texas Field is "water-driven" and that the allowable set will maintain a con-
tinuous and uniform replacement of oil by water; witnesses for the plaintiffs,
on the other hand, testified that the oil is "gas-driven" and that the allowed
rate of production will cause great waste and loss in the field. "In fact", said
Judge Hutcheson, "so radical are their differences and so contrary their opinions,
so voluble, so volatile are most of the witnesses in advancing them, and so equal
are they all in cocksureness, that form of knowing which easily mistakes
certitude for certainty, that, if we assume . . . them all to have equal theoretical
knowledge and equal absence of intention to deceive, the theories as such might
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of prorationing will curtail competitive drilling and eliminate the
costs of unnecessary off-set wells; nor insure the proper location of
wells on the geologic structure; nor maintain an efficient oil-gas
ratio and proper rate of flow. Of this the experience of the past year
affords ample demonstration. In terms of conservation, even the
proposed scheme to preserve the wells of settled production by pegging
the price at the average cost of operation of such wells presents a
dilemma. To maintain wells of settled production it would be neces-
sary to curtail the flush wells below an efficient rate of flow, and this
would stimulate competitive development in flush fields to build up
higher relative potentials.
To achieve true conservation a fundamental reorganization of
the entire system of production is imperative. Engineers are agreed
that scientific production of an oil pool must be predicated upon the
geologic structure and not upon fortuitous property lines. There
are various legal plans to adapt production methods to the geologic
structure; they have been summarized by the term "unit operation."
The essential features from a conservation point of view of an
equitable scientific plan of unit operation are the placement of wells
by contour lines, the apportionment of the production according to
boundary lines irrespective of the location of the wells through which
production is secured, and the allocation of volume to acreage con-
tent.10 7 But even if scientific operation of oil pools is secured,
paradoxically enough, an unrestrained program of mere scientific
exploitation might so increase the supply of crude oil as to further
demoralize the market. A demoralized market would force reckless
competition between pools; flush fields would force the abandonment
of the fields of settled production even though all were operating
on a unit basis. Proration must be superimposed upon unit opera-
tion to prevent unrestrained flush production from leading to
waste.108
best be held to counterbalance, .. . " Cf. conflict of testimony among geologists
on East Texas proration orders, reprinted in (1932) 31 OIL AND GAS JOURNAL
No. 19, p. 14. Also, of. testimony of geologists in Champlin Refining Co. v.
Corporation Commission, supra note 89. But however much geologists may dis-
agree as to the amount of oil conserved by proration, they are substantially
agreed that proration falls far short of anything approaching truly scientific
production.
107. Ibid.
108. Some have argued that unit operation would stabilize the industry without
proration. This assumes, however, that no new fields will be discovered whose
efficient rate of flow even under unit operation would be so high as to cause the
premature abandonment of fields of settled production. It also fails to provide a
mechanism of control if demand slackens, through more efficient refining and usEo,
decline in exports, or fluctuations in the business cycle. Competition between pools
may lead to the same kinds of waste as competition between wells.
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But proration affects price; proper exploitation to achieve con-
servation while not price fixing is inextricably linked with price.
As the events of the past year demonstrate, the effects of proration
on price, while initially attractive from the point of view of
investment, defeats itself by stimulating exploration and discovery
beyond the rate necessary to sustain the calculated production.10
Such new discovery disturbs the equilibrium of the price structure,
compelling a further reduction in all proration quotas to the further
detriment of capital investments. Stringent curtailment of allowables
carries with it financial disaster because insufficient volume, even
at a "fair price," nets insufficient income to meet fixed charges; 110
and insufficient financial support in turn leads to inefficient equip-
ment and operation, causing the very waste which conservation seeks
to avoid. In order to avoid this dilemma, one more legal device
must be added to secure planned production. "Projects for stabiliza-
tion and proration must prove futile unless in some way, the
equivalent of the certificate of public convenience and necessity is
made a prerequisite to embarking new capital in an industry in which
the capacity already exceeds the production schedules." 211 There
must be control of new drilling in proved-up fields and checks on
109. New wells completed for the past four years are as follows.
1929 ....................................... 26,356
1930 .................................. .... 21,240
1931 ....................................... 12,432
1932 .......................... ............ 15,021
Of completed wells in 1931 there were 6,778 oil producers; in 1932, 10,444 oil
producers-a net gain of 3,656 producing wells in 1932. (1933) 31 OIL AND GAS
JOURNAL No. 36, p. 61. For a survey of new fields found during the past year,
see note 11, supra. And it seems to be more than mere coincidence that (1932)
31 OIL AND GAS JouRNAL No. 23 in its issue published the week after the highest
price posting for the year 1932, carried the following headlines: "Wildcatting is
Spreading in East Texas and Several New Wells are Scheduled" (p. 34); "Polk
County is Getting Another Conroe Play; Wildcatting Stimulated On Gulf Coast"
(p. 44); "New Well in Harvey County, Kansas, Good for 5,000 Barrels per Day
from Chat" (p. 46); "While Community Well in Noble County Tests Sand,
Leasers Keep Busy in Three Counties" (p. 47) ; "Northeastern Colorado Test Core
Bleeding Oil; Failure Reported in South Dakota Wildcat" (p. 49); "Newest
Completion in Tuleta Field Looks Better Than Discovery and Imports Fresh
Interest" (p. 50); "Increase In Operations in Hobbs Field, New Mexico; Oregon
Well Shows Little Oil and Gas" (p. 51); "Wildcat Four Miles Southeast of
Conroe Field May Mean Opening of Separate Pool" (p. 57).
110. See note 10, sypra.
111. Mr. Justice Brandeis dissenting in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 286
U. S. 262 (1932). In this connection the American Petroleum Institute has
recently stated, "Producing capacity being already far in excess of consuming
requirements, there is no public interest in developing new pools, and, therefore,
production from new pools should be restricted to the utmost limits of the laws
of the states." (1933) 68 OIL WEEKLY No. 9, p. 8.
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the opening of new fields, not necessarily that price may be main-
tained, but that production may not increase beyond a point where
it can be efficiently absorbed and used.
It has been the fashion to attribute most of the ills of the oil in-
dustry to the stupidity of property law; but the frantic race of
speculators to discover new pools, heedless of market conditions, has
not been the fault of the law. This is a fault line which runs through
our entire economic structure. It is the problem of excess capacity.
No plan of unit operation, no scheme of proration, no interstate com-
pact can long insure the stabilization necessary for conservation
unless some device is provided to control excess capacity.
Those who oppose proration assert that all "artificial attempts" to
control "the natural operation of the law of supply and demand" have
proved futile. They draw inspiration for these asservations from
the unsuccessful attempts to fix prices in rubber, coffee, copper and
wheat. But in these industries the attempt was'made to peg price
directly without adequate provigion for controlling existing supply
and preventing expansion of productive capacity which is otherwise
stimulated by stabilized price. In oil, proration to market demand
coupled with control of drilling prevents potential from becoming
actual supply and restricts that supply by reference to some geological
criteria to meet a demand based upon some use standard. And since
price is a function of these two factors, inevitably conservation affects
price. But the price range is a resultant of conservation and does
not necessarily guarantee existing capital structures. Nor is pro-
ration necessarily a step in the socialization of all large scale industry.
Those who urge that the oil industry should be taken over by the
state fail as a rule to recognize the difficulties facing adminis-
trative bodies in operating the business. Indeed, proration by de-
fining a plane of competition prevents the cut-throat practices and
waste which might otherwise compel government ownership. And
leaders of the industry have recognized that proration by preventing
waste cuts down long-run costs and thus avoids future demand for
out-and-out price fixing.
V
Price, Conservation And Control
There can be no pretense that such a comprehenive plan can be
adopted by a single stroke. Reorganization of industry is won by
hard-fought advances against each entrenched position. Compromise
offers brief armistice in the battle between competing vested interests.
Only long range observation gives a picture of the whole line of
battle and the ultimate objective. From an observation post, the
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immediate legislative programs embodied in existing proration
statutes, the proposed uniform law and an interstate compact, appear
as salients driven toward the objective of planned production.
The uniform law openly, and present proration laws implicitly,
recognize the interrelation of price and waste, and the legal basis
for control which that affords. The restrictions on the market set
up by proration attempt to raise the plane of competition for in-
dividuals within a pool and for pools within a state by limiting the
volume of production so that minimum price levels are maintained.
This imperils the ordinary safeguard of the consumer-the protec-
tion allegedly given by free competition. State proration com-
missions have sought to supplant that protection by the exercise
of their control over the market. And as a practical matter impartial
control of state proration is as essential in the interest of the
producers as in the interest of the consumers. Proration deals with
markets, and in the quest for markets the industry is a house divided
against itself. Royalty owners want high prices and high volume,
and are willing to concede some sacrifice of price to volume; the
small operators want high price and high volume, and are willing
to concede some sacrifice of volume to price-the divergence of
interest arising from the incidence of fixed charges."- Large in-
tegrated operators want high price and low volume when their tank
farms are full, but the reverse when there is empty storage; small
integrated operators want low prices and high volume to fill their
refining requirements from their own wells with low royalties. Large
refiners want a stabilized high-price crude so that expensive, efficient
refining equipment is necessary to realize a profit, and in this way
they hope to freeze out the small competitor; the small refiners want
low price crude so that with inefficient but inexpensive refining
equipment, cheap crude will permit undercutting of the large refiners.
The pipe lines want high volume regardless of price. Material-men
and labor want competitive drilling. Major oil states want the
present fields protected; the newer oil states want exploration and
discovery encouraged." 3 Under the present system of ascertaining
market demand of each pool by "nominations," control of proration
is thrown into the hands of but a single group-the buyers. Con-
servation programs and price structures have toppled in part be-
112. Royalty owners, of course, have no fixed charges. The operator finds the
greater fixed charge per unit by decreased production balanced by higher per
unit price, and the proportionately smaller burden of royalty payments.
113. In 1929 the federal government removed the public lands, which for the
most part lie in the new oil states, from further exploration and discovery.
Marshall and Meyers, supra note 1. Yielding to the importunities of the far
western states, the Department of the Interior on April 4, 1932 announced that
oil and gas prospecting permits would again be issued.
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cause of internal strife engendered in the industry by the partiality
of those in control. 14
The oil states have realized that their market is demoralized not
only because of internal strife but also because it is nation wide and
proration by a single state results in a loss of that state's market.
Consequently the Oil States' Advisory Committee was created to
control the national market by correlating the proration activities in
the various states. But the unofficial, informal bargaining of the
oil states through this Committee has proved unsatisfactory to its
sponsors. Because the sanctions are purely voluntary, there exists
the ever present threat that a state, confronted with tremendous
flush production from new development, may be unable to withstand
the internal pressure for outlets and will fail to adhere to the agreed
quota." 5 Furthermore although the quota agreements entered into
by representatives of the states and agreed to in the large by the
industry have been carefully clothed in innocent vocabulary to escape
its clutches, nevertheless the fearsome though now somewhat emascu-
lated federal anti-trust law lurks in the shadows. It is averred that
the quotas are merely objective statements of existing demand and
serve merely as proof of the accuracy of the arithmetic involved in
compiling the nominations for each pool; and that when the sum
total of nominations in a state tally with the quota "found" by the
Advisory Committee, it is conclusively demonstrated that the "gauge
of production" is working efficiently to eliminate "certain artificial
friction" in the operation of "the law of supply and demand."
But despite this innocent rationale, the oil states are anxious to
secure congressional approval of their combination to curtail produc-
114. For example, it was alleged in the Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation
Commission, supra note 35, that through peculiar circumstances of pipe line
ownership and production control, it was possible for six pipe line companies
to favor operators in the Seminole pool by nominating in favor of that pool
when prices of oil were high, but allowing the proportional share of the
Oklahoma City pool to be increased when prices of crude were below a "r(-
munerative basis." Brief for Appellant, Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation
Commission, supra note 2, at 16 et seq. Also, Transcript of Record, vol. 1,
part 2, at 290 et seq. In April, 1931, upon testimony of purchasers, the quota
for Oklahoma City pool was increased to meet "seasonal demand" (1931) 29
OIm AN GAS JOURNAL No. 49, p. 32. The price at this time for 380 crude wag
63 cents a barrel, the same price that was called below "remunerative basis"
in the Transcript of Record, supra. And the whole system of privately paid
umpires is not likely to inspire confidence among those who neither pay hig
salary nor have much voice in his appointment. Brief for Appellant, supra, at
11 et seq., also Transcript of Record, vol. 1, part 2, p. 279 et seq.
115. Virtually all major producing states have, officially or unofficially,
exceeded the production quotas set by the Oil States Advisory Committee
during the past year.
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tion. They have therefore proposed the formal interstate compact
between the producing states and have sponsored the bill in Congress
to obtain the necessary federal consent. Such consent would both
satisfy the constitutional requirements and also remove the production
of oil from the grasp of the anti-trust law.1" The interstate compact
would substitute the control of a hierarchy of state commissions over
the market for the control of free competition supported by the anti-
trust laws." 7
Proponents of the projected interstate compact assert that the
hierarchy of state commissions, composed of a central agency which
allocates quotas and the state commissions which translate the quotas
into allowables, -will "collectively exercise their police power in trust
for the Nation." 'Is But, if we must use the language of equity, good
equity teaching tells us that in appointing trustees their possible
adverse interest must be considered. Recent events show clearly that
the oil states are primarily interested in higher prices to obtain higher
royalties, higher taxes, and higher wages." 9 The current price of
crude, like the price of many other commodities may be much too low.
But it is questionable whether the eight oil producing states should
be allowed the uncontrolled power of insuring their prosperity at the
expense of consumers in the forty-eight states. 20 While it is true
116. UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, Article 1, Section 10 (3) provides that
"no State shall, without the consent of Congress . . . enter into any agreement
or compact -with another state." Since the anti-trust laws are statutory rather
than constitutional in origin, congressional consent to an interstate compact
would render them inapplicable.
117. The present bill before Congress for an interstate compact proposes an
interstate fact-finding commission to determine national demand. This inter-
state commission is to be composed of one representative from each of the
compacting states, presumably a member of either the state conservation
commission or of the Oil States Advisory Committee, and one representative of
the federal government. See note 104, supra.
118. See REPORT V OF THE FEDERAL OM CONSERVATION BOARD (1932) 22.
119. The following statement, issued by the Texas Railroad Commission on
January 2, 1933 (reprinted in (1933) 31 OL AND GAS Jou0NAL No. 33, p. 8),
represents the attitude of the oil producing states: "Our proration orders in
the past have saved the oil operators and royalty owners of Texas more than
$2,000,000,000.00, and the oil industry is the only industry during the past
mad rush for normalcy and prosperity that has weathered the storm of de-
pressed conditions, and that has tended to lead us aright. It is the only industry
that has placed Texas far in advance of any state in surmounting the gravest
situation in all history. And for any reason now to lose control . . . would be a
severe blight on the name of our state, to say nothing of the enormous tax to
our state that would be destroyed and the harsh blow to our public school
system and not to mention the great loss to the University of Texas and the
A. and M. College."
120. With respect to who paid the taxes and royalties which the Texas
Railroad Commission "saved" the State by proration, it is significant to note
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that simple proration does not eliminate all competition, it defines a
plane of competition, the level of which is all important to the in-
dustrial and individual users of petroleum products throughout the
nation.
The projected interstate compact represents an old political device
used for a new economic purpose. This interstate compact partakes
of the nature of an economic alliance between a group of interested
states to control a national market rather than the usual agreement
between contiguous states to settle some purely regional boundary
or water dispute or carry out jointly some clear state function which
is not circumscribed by the geographical boundaries of a single state,
such as a tunnel or bridge project. 12 1 Yet this does not mean that
an interstate compact is not a proper or suitable legal means of at-
taining the nation-wide control of oil markets which is so essential
a feature of any rational program for achieving conservation. It
only points to the necessity of assuring the consuming public sufficient
federal or other representation in that interstate commission which
forecasts the national demand and allocates domestic and foreign
quotas. The proposed interstate compact allegedly does provide such
representation but a careful perusal of that bill indicates that federal
participation is largely for the purpose of pledging the national
government to restrict imports and that in setting both domestic and
foreign quotas, the consumer's,-interest as contrasted with the interest
of the oil states could be seriously out voted. 22
VI
Legal Basis Of Control
Methods of control of oil production on a national scale rest on
different legal bases. Control by the states rests on the police power,
that for the period during which proration was more or less effective In
curtailing production-i.e., between July 1, 1931 and July 1, 1932-(1932) 31
OIL AND GAS JOURNAL No. 10, p. 40, reported that "average gasoline prices at
filling stations . . . consistently improved." For an analysis of the economic
effect of such a transfer of purchasing power upon the general prosperity of
the country, see Stocking, note 100, supra.
121. For a collection of authorities dealing with the interstate compact, coo
ELY, op. cit. supra note 20, also see MacMahon, Compact-Interstate, 4 ENOY-
CLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL SCIENCES (1931) 109-113, and authorities there cited.
122. As presented to Congress, the interstate fact-finding body which would
determine national demand would be made up of one representative from the
Federal Government and representatives from each of the oil producing states
ratifying the compact. An amendment to this bill suggested by the Department
of the Interior would seek to guard against sectionalism by providing that
the compacting states should appoint an interstate advisory body to serve as
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indirectly controlled and codrdinated by the nation through an inter-
state compact. Direct control and regulation by the federal govern-
ment rests-generally upon the commerce clause. Under either form
of procedure the constitutional problems are not insolvable.
The use by the states of the police power to effect conservation has
been amply exploited to indicate a sound constitutional basis for
production control. In numerous cases the courts have recognized
that restriction of production to prevent waste does not offend due
process of law. True, some courts debated whether price is incident
to waste or whether waste is incident to price-and indeed Mr. Justice
Butler sought to settle the matter by "putting aside" the relationship
-nevertheless it can be demonstrated that price effect can not be
separated from true conservation, and it is futile to attempt to decide
which of two concurrent results is primary. A national program of
conservation divorced from price has little meaning. The country
has vast resources, and the technology of production, refining, and
use is constantly advancingY2 The problem is not that of obtaining
oil at any cost, but of having it at a low cost over as long a period as
practical.124
The decisions sustaining the power to conserve oil furnish ample
justification for control to achieve this end so long as the methods
employed are impartial and not arbitrary. Narrowly construed, even
the MacMillan and the People's Petroleam cases hold merely that the
legislature had not as yet empowered the state commission to prorate
to market demand. The only other cases in which proration orders
have been invalidated did not deny the power to prorate to market
demand but took objection to the inequitable and arbitrary exercise
of the power.'2
a joint committee with such federal agency as the President might designate
and that no action "affecting interstate or foreign commerce" might be taken
by this joint committee without the concurrence of a majority of Federal
representatives. ELY, op. cit. supra note 20, at 222.
123. Estimates of oil resources recoverable by present methods have been
constantly revised upward during the past twenty years. Since even the most
optimistic calculations of recovery by present methods range from 25% to
40% of the reservoir content, technological improvements in recovery would
radically increase available oil. Furthermore there are enormous untapped
oil resources recoverable from petroliferous shales by distillation and from coal
by hydrogenation. In refining, recent developments in cracking and hydro-
genation make possible complete utilization of crude. In use, the limits of
efficiency have not yet been sighted. In view of all this, "scarcity" has become
a "wolf-cry." This new aspect of conservation has received international
recognition. See H-AN, LE NouvEL ASPECT DU PROBL UE PLYMoLER (1932).
124. Cf. Tryon and Schoenfeld, Utilization of National Wealth, part 1,
Mineral and Power Resources, in I REPORT OF TE PRESIDENT'S RESEARCH
CoArnrr'Tr ON RzcENiCT Soc AL. TRENDs (1933) 59.
125. See note 61, supra.
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The opinion in the Champlin case provides the only stumbling block
in the way of sustaining control by the states. As has already been
pointed out, in that case there is the implication that if a price effect
were demonstrated, proration orders might be enjoined. In the im-
mediate future the cases will probably revolve around attempts to
prove particular methods of proration "unjust or arbitrary"; and
since the Champlin decision links "otherwise invalid" with "unjust
or arbitrary" there may be attempts to assimilate price effect into
arbitrary action. But since price and conservation are so interlinked
such attempts seem doomed to failure.
However, the proration programs of the oil states threaten to break
down because of the administrative difficulties of enforcement. The
present methods have proved onerous upon the operators, expensive
and unwieldy, and have not succeeded in stopping the flow of bootleg
oil. Although unitization has long been advocated as the only efficient
means of preventing the major wastes of production,120 it now appears
equally essential to achieve effective administration of proration.
Unit operation pr6vides self-governing pools. In unitized fields the
state need no longer police each well. It would only be required to
cotrdinate the pools within a state. And since unit operation connotes
lower capital costs and fair apportionment of production among
producing properties, it minimizes the temptation to bootleg and drys
up the sources of hot oil. Without some such self-regulatory device,
the proration programs of the states are both politically and practical-
ly unworkable.
Voluntary unitization has been counseled as the means by which
"the difficulties may be adjusted by covenant." But the experience
of the past years indicates clearly that the divergent interests of
potential covenantors prevent such adjustments by voluntary action.
Compulsory unit operation by command of the state is necessary not
to enable the state to enter the oil business but to create internal
self-government within the pools. Since unit operation affords the
most practical means of administering proration, further legal justi-
fication for compulsion is thus provided.1 27
But even if the oil states take the necessary steps to plan state-
wide production by proration, unitization, and control of drilling,
cotrdination of state action is essential to prevent uncontrolled inter-
state competition which would ultimately force a breakdown of the
126. Oliver and Umpleby, Principles of Unit Operation (1930) TRANSAC-
TIONS OF THE A. I. M. E. 105. And see authorities cited in Marshall and
Meyers, supra note 1, at 59 et seq.
127. The legal basis for compulsory unitization has been discussed else-
where. Marshall and Meyers, supra note 1. Cf. German, Compulsory Unit
Operation of Oil Pools (1932) 20 CAL. L. REv. 111.
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entire plan. Co6rdination is proposed through the interstate compact.
Such a correlated state program may need and call upon federal aid.
In order to make effective local legislation which would be rendered
nugatory unless co6rdinated through the commerce power with
similar local legislation,12  the Federal government might well
stimulate enthusiasm for the interstate compact by prohibiting the
shipment in interstate commerce of oil not produced in accordance
with the terms of such a compact.- If all the oil states can not agree
to enter into such a compact, the federal government is in a position
to make the compact binding with less than unanimous consent
following the procedure adopted in the Hoover dam project which
was authorized by a compact between all but one of the interested
parties.1
30
Fear of extensive federal participation has recently caused a
noticeable cooling in the enthusiasm for an interstate compact. In-
deed the chairman of the Texas Railroad Commission has openly
assigned this as his reason for opposition to the compact and has
taken a stand that oil production is a local matter which can best
be handled by each state playing a lone hand.1 31 But neither Texas
nor any other major producing state can transform a problem which
has been proved to be national in scope into an issue of purely local
128. MacMahon, supra note 121.
129. To engender desire on the part of producers to conform to conservation
plans, Congress might amend the income tax act to reUstablish the old fiat
allowance of 5% for depletion [38 Stat. 166 (1913)] for those producers
employing wasteful methods, and to permit the present 27/ % (U. S. REVISNrn
ACT of 1932 § 114 (163)) allowance to efficient producers. The difference in
the method of production would be a sufficient justification for the reclassi-
fication. The present 27h % depletion rate admittedly partakes of the nature
of a bounty specially granted for gas and oil operators to stimulate develop-
ment of natural resources. See Palmer v. Bender, 53 Sup. Ct. 225 (1933).
130. BOUuDER CANYON PRO3EOT AcT, December 21, 1928 c. 42 [45 STAT.
1057 (1928)]. This act approved the Colorado River compact, which had been
provided for by an earlier act of Congress [42 STAT. 171 (1921)], and which
had been signed by the state commissioners and the federal representative to
become effective when ratified by Congress and the legislatures of all of the states
concerned. Arizona had refused to approve the compact; and the new act
provided that the agreement should go into effect upon its ratification by the
legislatures of California and five of the six other southwestern states. All
except Arizona ratified the compact and the Boulder Canyon Act was ac-
cordingly declared to be in effect. [49 STAT. 20 (1929)]. This procedure was
approved by the Supreme Court in Arizona v. California, 283 U. S. 423 (1931).
131. The reply of Public Service Commissioner Hill of Kansas to this state-
ment indicates the futility of attempting to curtail oil production on a local
scale. Said Mr. Hill: "There may come a time when Texas will discover the
need of co-operation. In the not far distant future the oil fields of Western
Kansas will control the oil market and if we adopt the same provincial policy,
Texas will regret her isolation." 31 Om AND GAS JOURNAL (1933) No. 35, p. 40.
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significance. Furthermore, the alternatives presented to the produc-
ing states are not proration or no proration, a compact or no compact.
Rather they must decide whether they will retain a voice in the control
of production through proration coupled with an interstate compact
or have the nation, through the Federal government, superimpose
that control.
But whether the oil states act in concert or not, they must expect
eventual federal provision for consumer protection. Proration plans
which seek to restrict production to market demand run afoul of
the anti-trust laws. Where "price dominates trade between states,"
regulation of local business practices, themselves not a part of the
stream of commerce but which directly affect the price of com-
modities moving in interstate trade, has been sustained.5 2 The
Supreme Court has asserted that "if Congress deems certain re-
curring practices, though not really part of interstate commerce,
likely to obstruct, restrain or burden it, it has the power to subject
them to national supervision and restraint." 133 Combinations or
conspiracies in restraint of trade by producers do not escape the
federal law on the ground that their functions are not interstate
in character; 134 nor can they achieve immunity because a state aids
or abets them in order to control local oil production.
The proposed interstate compact would take the conservation
program out of the scope of the federal anti-trust law. But the
132. Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U. S. 1 (1923). Cf. Stafford v.
Wallace, 258 U. S. 495 (1922).
133. United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S.
344 (1922). It is significant that in the first Coronado coal case, supra, the
Supreme Court refused to assess triple damages against a labor union under
the Sherman anti-trust act. It declared that "coal mining is not interstate
commerce, and the power of Congress does not extend to its regulation as such,"
and "obstruction to coal mining is not a direct obstruction to interstate com-
merce." Yet when in the second Coronado case (Coronado Coal Co. v. United
Mine Workers, 268 U. S. 295 (1925)), the plaintiff presented evidence of a
substantial reduction in the flow of coal in interstate commerce, the court re-
versed a directed verdict in favor of the defendants and said: "The mere
reduction in the supply of an article to be shipped in interstate commerce by
the illegal or tortious prevention of its manufacture or production is ordinarily
an indirect and remote obstruction to that commerce. But when the intent
of those unlawfully preventing the manufacture or production is shown to be
to restrain or control the supply entering and moving in interstate commerce, of
the price of it in interstate markets, their action is a direct violation of the
Anti-Trust Act."
134. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1 (1911); United States
v. American Tobacco Company, 221 U. S. 106 (1911). Cf. Pennsylvania v.
West Virginia, 262 U. S. 553 (1922); West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221
U. S. 229 (1910). Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Noydel, 278 U. S. 1 (1928).
But cf. ELY, op. cit. supra note 20, at 270.
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oil states and the industry can not seriously expect the federal gov-
ernment naively to abdicate its power and duty to protect the con-
sumer. Rather, we may expect to see in the near future a definite
federal policy for oil and other raw materials. Control of produc-
tion such as is essential to a sound conservation policy will be
permissive, but in order to obtain immunity from the existing fed-
eral anti-trust laws, 135 approval of a projected conservation program
will have to be obtained from a reconstituted Federal Trade Com-
mission or some other designated federal agency. This would ef-
fectively place the determination of supply and demand, and price,
in impartial hands. To justify its decisions, such an agency would
have to ground its findings on sound conservation policy. Demand
would have to be gauged in terms of efficient use.5 0 Existing supply
would have to be estimated according to objective engineering data
on volume of production at a scientific rate of flow of the existing
wells, with due regard to oil-gas ratios. More intensive e:ploitation
of the known fields or the discovery and opening of new fields would
have to depend upon whether the existing capacity production ade-
quately fulfilled the demands of efficient users.
If the oil states do not avail themselves of the opportunity to re-
organize production under state auspices, they may expect a definite
drive for federal control independent of the states. Legally such
federal control may be achieved by a variety of means. The national
government might proceed directly under the commerce power to
regulate the transportation in interstate commerce of oil not pro-
duced according to a conservation plan which would include permits
for development, compulsory unit operation, and proration.1 T Or
Congress might look beyond the physical stream of interstate com-
merce so as to regulate directly the production of oil. In lieu of
the negative prohibitions of the anti-trust acts to maintain com-
135. As an alternative, proration could be attacked on the ground that it
burdens interstate commerce. Cf. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, upra note
134. But cf. Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission, supra note 35;
ELY, op. cit. supra note 20, at 67 et seq.
136. Efficient use embraces, of course, the many steps leading from the
oil well to the consumer. To take but one example, inefficient skimming plants
located in flush fields can cause as much "waste" as inefficient production. And
while the present Texas law denying the commission power to hold "any mode,
manner or process of refining crude constitutes waste" (supra note 27, at
art. 6014 K), may be justified on the ground that it seeks to simplify the
present problem, such considerations cannot ultimately be excluded from the
content of "demand.'
137. See Stanley, The Dramau of the Oil Industry-Calling for Federal
Regulation (1931) 56 A. B. A. REP. 669. Ford also suggests both the use of
the war power, since oil is a military necessity, and the treaty power. Ford,
op. cit. supra note 90.
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petition, Congress might enact positive regulations of productive
practices which affect interstate commerce. The interrelationship
of conservation and the market is clear. Wasteful production can
burden the consumer in the market as much as conspiracy and
combination.138  The anti-trust laws protect interstate commerce
against the burden of the latter i positive regulation to achieve con-
servation would protect interstate commerce against the burden of
waste. Constitutionally it is no more illogical to give the federal
government control over conservation to protect the market than
to give the state control over the market to protect conservation.
The country is already well committed to a policy of conservation
of this natural resource. The proposals here made are merely the
results of the logic of such a policy. That they will bother the
professors of "free enterprise" is obvious. And any control of pro-
duction by other standards would not be conservation but conces-
sions to the vested interests in the production business. That such
a program as here outlined may not guarantee the present invest-
ments in uneconomic wells is both painful and patent.
138. Cf. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, and United States v. American
Tobacco Company, both upra note 134; Northern Securities Co. v. United
States, 193 U. S. 197 (1904).
It has been asserted that because oil production is like mining and manu-
facture it is not subject to federal regulation under the commerce power. Yet
it is significant that notwithstanding United States v. Knight, 156 U. S. 1 (1894)
which first held that since manufacturing was not interstate commerce, com-
binations of manufacturers could not restrain it, the Supreme Court sub-
sequently in the Standard Oil and Tobacco cases dissolved a combination of
manufacturing which was shown to effect interstate markets. Furthermore,
the decisions most frequently cited to prove that production is not interstate
commerce have not involved an issue of federal versus state regulation. Rather
they represent attempts to preserve a state's power to tax producers who sought
to escape state taxes. Husler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U. S. 245 (1922)
(anthracite coal); Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U. S. 172 (1923) (iron
ore); Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U. S. 284 (1927) (natural gas);
Utah Power and Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U. S. 165 (1932) (electricity). Or
they have been instances where a refusal to allow the state to regulate would
have then left the entire field of activity go unregulated. Kidd v. Pearson,
128 U. S. 1 (1888) (intoxicating liquor) ; Crescent Cotton Oil Co. v. Mississippi,
257 U. S. 129 (1921) (cotton gins); Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation
Commission, supra note 35 (oil). The vast majority of federal statutes predi-
cated upon the commerce power have been upheld. See GAVIT, THE COMMERCE
CLAusE (1932) Appendix A, B, C (summarizing all the Supreme Court cases
dealing with commerce clause). 'But cf. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251
(1918). Indeed, so wide is the discretion permitted Congress under the com-
merce power that it is now proposed to ground federal regulation of holding
companies upon the commerce power. See Smith, Federal Regulation of Light
and Power Companies to appear in a report of the Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce Committee of House of Representatives, 72nd Congress, 1st Sess.
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